The Organization of Our Military Forces by Leahy, Arthur
This article was downloaded by: ["Queen's University Libraries, Kingston"]
On: 12 August 2013, At: 05:34
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,
UK
Royal United Services
Institution. Journal
Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19
The Organization of Our Military
Forces
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Leahy R.E.
Published online: 11 Sep 2009.
To cite this article: Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Leahy R.E. (1871) The Organization of
Our Military Forces, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 15:63, 176-201, DOI:
10.1080/03071847109417042
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847109417042
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,
or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views
expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the
Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with
primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any
losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,
and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the
Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,
sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is
expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 ["
Qu
ee
n's
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es,
 K
ing
sto
n"
] a
t 0
5:3
4 1
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
T w s ~ ~ Y ,  l'cbmaly 1-lth, 1571. 
LIECXESA~T-GESTIUL TI: ITos. SIR JAJIES LIXDSAY, K.C.X.G., 
Inspector-Gcncral of Resene Forccs, in tlic Chair. 
XdXJZS of X E D E R S  who joinccl thc Institution bctrrcen tho Gth 3 r d  
14th FcbrunrJ; 1671. 
LIFE. 
M'hUAL. 
Shine, IIarcourt, L i d .  43rd Yiddlc- 
Smith, Carlton, Capt. 1st R o p l  Surrey Cnmpbcll, Wm. &I., Captnin Ropl  
O ~ o n n c ~ ,  II. Licut.-Col. ~ a ~ r z 3  Star
Xicliolsou, 11. IJIallcy, Capt. 62nd Rrgt. 
ROSC, IF. Ji., Ensign late 32nd Rrgt. 
aardiucr, R. M., Corn.-Glcncral. 
Fnrrcli, 11. c., Cqt .  R.A. 
I .  
scx Rinc Toluntccrs. 
3Lilith. Enninccrs. 
corps. 
TEE ORGAKlZATIOlU OF Olin MILITARY FORCES. 
By Lieutenant-Colonel ASTIWE Lgxn-, 1L.E. 
Thc CIUIIDIAK : I hare  much plensurc in introducing to tho meeting 
Licutcnnnt Colonel Lenhy of the Royd Eiigincers, who proposes to- 
night to rend R paper upon '' tlic Organization of our Jlilitary l'orccs." 
It may bc in tlie recollcction of iiinny of tllc gciitlcmcn present, tlint 
two gcnrs ago Colonel Lcaliy,-who mas Eoiiiewhrt in ndrnncc of his 
time,-wad a papcr in this Institution on tlic same subject. It rc- 
c e i d  w r y  great attention, was n r y  much considered, and, in marry 
respects, much approved, and i t  did liini w r y  grcnt credit. Tlio 
subjcct upon which Iic proposes to clilatc to-night is one which has  
cngngeil tho nttciition of ~uilitnry men for a w r y  considcrablc period. 
If pcoplc Till I O O k  back at the papers which h a w  becii rcad in this 
Iristitotion, erid nt articles wvhicli I i n m  appeared in tlic Uiiitcd Scrvicc 
periodicds, tlicy will find that '' tlic orgiiiizntio~i of our forces " has 
been much discussed by military men, but it is oidy lately that tho 
interest in tlic question lins been cnliniiccd to a coIisiderablc extent, 
owing to the recent occiirrcnccs upon tlic Continent. Tlic subjcct l ins 
been so forced upon public attention that Goverumcnt has taken it up, 
and Parlinmc'llt will bc asked to pass its opinion upon tlic subject. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 ["
Qu
ee
n's
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es,
 K
ing
sto
n"
] a
t 0
5:3
4 1
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
TEE ORGANIZATIOX OF OUR MILITARY FORCES. 1’1’1 
Licut.-Col. ~ ~ E - m S :  Tho object of this paper is to revive n discys- 
sion* 011 Tile Organization of Our Ililitaiy Forces and Reserres, which 
was commenced in 18G8. 
The propositions on which n discussion is to bo takcn, hare been 
already csplaincd in n paper, read in April, 18G8, on thct 6; Organiza- 
tiou of Our Infantry Forces and Infantry Reserres,” to which was 
appended$ a project, worked out in detail, for adaptiug to our Regi- 
mental System tlie principlc ‘( of allowing soldiers, after a, shortserrice 
;‘in the Army, to lenrc its ranks, subject to the obliptionof returning 
‘ 6  to them when required.” § 
Tho suggestions in this paper had, during the prerious year (186.7) 
heen privately printed11 and submitted for considcration, in contradis- 
tinction to proposals for tho re-engagement of soldiers who had com- 
pleted ten years’ service, and for providing reserves for the regular 
regiments f roi n tlic Xilit ia . 
It is Itopcd that by means of tho discussion, information will be 
gained as to the points in which tlio actual organization is defcctipe, 
and the opinions of military men elicited on tlie technical arrangements 
necessary to produco tlic best possible defensiro result from the appli- 
cation of the principle of 6‘ short service.” 
In tlie pre-iious paper it was obserwcl that the .subject of Army 
Organization has to be considered under three heads :- 
A. Political. 
Under this head may be considered- 
The object for wliicli tho military Forces are maintained. 
The constitution of such Forces. 
The persons liable to military service, and thc conditions of such 
service. 
Tho general control or checks to which the esecutire, charged 
with the management or command of the Forces, and with the espen- 
lliturc of public moneys set apart for military purposes, shall bo 
liable. 
13. Xilitmy. 
The numbers, organization, and training of the combatant troops. 
The regulations under which they shall be called out. 
Tho dctcrmination bf tho numbers to bo annually embodied, and 
whether for permanent serrice or for n certain number of drills or days’ 
training. 
G. Administrative. 
The government of thc Forces. 
[Tllc rcfcrcncc3, ahcn not othcrnkc stated, nro to the Journal of the R o p l  
* Vol. xii, pages 337-358. 
f Vol. rii, pnges 310-337. 
3 Vol. xii, Appendis, p. 337, Tablcs I, 11, TIT, IY. 
5 SCC “Rcport of Royal Commission on Rccruiting, ISGG,” Appendix y. 
11 “ Proposals for an Improred Xilitary Organization, and for the Formation of R 
United Scrricc Institution.] 
&serro Force,” 18G7. 
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178 TIIE ORGAXIZATION OF OUR XILITARY FORCES. 
Tlic organization by which the supply of all things necessary for tlic 
cllicicncy of the combatant troops is regulated. 
Tlic accessory arrangements, madc with the object of increasing tlicir 
dlcfcnsiw or offensiw powcrs. 
Under tlic political head, I would only obserre, tliat it mill be 
the duty of tlic military authorities to give effect to such general 
plan as tlic Crown, on the advicc of Parliament, shall approve. 
If i t  were proposed to  make militnay service compulsory on a11 able- 
bodied youtlis, an arrangement under which, according to tlic mritcr of 
t h o .  recent article in the ‘‘ Edinburgh Review,” about 2G0,OOO men* 
annually would becomc liable to n cliance of military service ; it  is 
scarccly necessary to say tliat tlic problem of raising recruits, wlietlier 
for tlie regular or auxiliary forces, would be very much simplified. 
If, on tlic otlier Iiand, it be decided tliat tlic time has not arrived for 
adopting such an extreme and possibly.unequa1 system of personal 
tasation, it will be desirable to consider whether, by combining witli 
tlic Toluntary system n careful and comprchcnsi~e adaptation to the 
regular forces of tho principle of sliort service, and by arrangements 
for n more‘ lxrfcct training of tlic militia, tho military forces of the 
country cannot, a t  n reasonable cost, be placed in n position to fulfil 
all conditions of offenco and defence necessary for tho fulfilment of 
imperial engagements and for national safety. 
I would suggest tliat the discussion at  tliis Institution should, SO 
far as possible, be limited to tlic points conip+xl iritliin tlic second 
bead, and mliicli are chicfly, if not entirely, technical, viz., thc numbers, 
irnining, and orgauization of the combatant troops. 
Opinions arc therefore invited on the military and technical questions 
involved in tho following propositions :- 
I. Tlic reform of our military organization sliould bo sucli as to cnablc 
an army of about 200,000 infantry, with n due proportion of 
cavalry, artillery, engineers, and train, to be placed in tlic field 
for liomc defence. 
11. In order to effect this object, it is necessary tliat tlierc should be a 
suitable adaptation to the Regular forces of the principlc of 
‘‘ short service,” with liability to afterwards sen-c in tlio ‘‘ Rescrvcs.” 
111. There should be an appropriate erpansion of the regimental 
organization, so as to bring recruiting and arniy rcserws under 
the regimental system. 
1V. .The Uilitia battalions to be trained and organized so as to be a t  
all times ready to take their placc in tho Defcnsivc Army. A 
Nilitia Reseri-o to be formed. 
V. Each military district to be provided v i th  the nucleus of n com- 
plctc staff for an ariny corps. Ono or moro dirisions of Regular 
troops, complete in all arms and rcquircmcnts for active service, 
to be quartered in each militar~- district. 
TI. The General Officers of districts to supervise a11 reserve and 
* Reriea on ‘‘ The lCIilitnry Forces of the Crown,” No, 971 n 220. 
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TIiE ORGASIZATIOX OF OUII. MILITARY FORCES. 179 
nnsiliary forces within their districts. Brigades of the Regular 
and auxiliary forces in each district to be annually encamped 
and nianauvred, with due proportions of cavaliy, artillcry, 
engineers, and train. 
I \rill now, without reiterating arguments frequently advanced, 
csplain as briefly L ~ S  I can the foregoing proposals. . 
some of them haw been so long and fully discussed, both by tlic 
press and at  this Institution, that .  they may bc accepted without dis- 
sent. No claini is made to originality of principle, but i t  is beliered 
tllat details worked out in 1SG7-GS ~ o u l d  bc the means of promoting 
Inaiiy of tlic objects mliicli are admitted to bc desiderata in any general 
scheme for Army reform. 
1. qri th  regard to numbers :- 
It \ ~ a s  hewn* that in 1867-68 the military cstablislimcnts whicli it 
within tlic power of the Crown to  enrol for the defence of thc 
realm, or of the possessions subject to IIer Najcsty, and which there- 
fore came under tlic supervision of the IIome, Indian, and Colonial 
Governments, amouutcd nominally to no less than 1,300,000 nien ; of 
tllis number about 350,000 were trained, and more or less organized. 
Ilbout 350,000 mr(? trained, but not organized (men with 
mllsliets), and about 570,000 n-erc neither trained nor organized (nien 
on paper). 
1)cdocting the forces in India (lSO,OOO), the Trained Bands (200,000), 
and the Colonid Reserves (300,000), the British ‘( estcibZi~lIments” avail- 
able for imincdintc re-organization amount to c i h r t  150,000 Regular 
troops, about 250,000 Reserve and Nilitio troops, and over 200,000 
roluntcers ; total, over G00,OOO men. 
I must observe that the estnblisliments~ arc not complete. 
In order to  work out a project, it is necessary to assume n certain 
object t o b e  attained, but as tlic objects for wliich our forces arc 
mnintnincd liavc not as yet been definitely laid don-n by Parliament, 
or other final authority, i t  will bc excusable if the nuiiibcrs proposed 
for tlic field forces sl!ould not command unanimous approval. 
I hm-c taken tliosc for-vliich I bclicvc thera is tlic best military 
authority, and as they correspond very nearly with thc avaiIabIc 
6‘ establishments ” of regular and iiiilitin forces, they cannot be put 
domi as cstravagnnt. 
I belicvc them to bc sufficient to prcrcnt periodical invasion panics. 
11. Short Service :- 
A general and comprchensirc application of the principle of ( 6  sliort 
service” in the regular Army, with a liability to afterwards SC~J-C in 
its “ Reserves,” is o necessary condition of an clastic and economical 
military system. 
All first enlistments should be for ‘6 short service,” by wllich should 
* r o l .  rii, poges 313-319. 
f detail of the Etrength and composition of thc British Army, 16G8, d l  be 
bml ir Appendix Iris, p. 579, 1-01, i, “Xilitaty Forcca of tho Croim.” 
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180 TIIE ORGAXIZATIOS OF OUR b1ILITdRT FORCES. 
bc understood, an cngagcnicnt for not less than one or more than three 
years’ continuous scrricc in tho rcgular infantry. 
In  tlic regular cavalry, artillery, and engineers, the 1~i ior l  of service 
may bc cstended to such time as is necessary for training soldiers in 
the eliicient perforniancc of their special duties. 
Thcrc should be no obligation on the part of nicn on their first engage- 
ment to serve out of Europe in tinic of peace. 
An attcmpt to combine the short serricc engagcmcnis with scrvicc 
in the Colonies or in India, or arrqngemcnts irliiclr would gire thc 
recruit a t  first enlistment n positive optinn of sexing continuously for 
longer periods than indicated, would, it is bclicred, be fatal to thc 
(‘ sliort scrricc” sy-stem. 
To reinnin in tlic Army should bc n rcward for thosc ri-110 by tlicir 
conduct and attciition to military duties dnring the period of short 
sen-icc sliow tlicnisclves worthy of the privilege. 
Pensions should bc granted not G d y ,  as np-, to old soldiers, but to 
short scrricc men u-ho fulfil tlicir engagements in respcct of subse ucnt 
seirice in the Reserrcs. Tlia pcnsions of the latter need not, ?IOW- 
c-icr, coinmeiice beforc 50  ears of age. 
Service fu India and a t  niilitary stations abroad should bc pro- 
Tided for by a second aiid supplementary engagement, which should 
not iu anj- case be made until thc recruit hncl completcd one year of his 
sliort service cngagcnicnt. 
As a nile, the engagement for seiricc in India should not bc made 
wit11 men of less thou two years’ service. This is necessary to ensure 
thc Arni-y in India being coniposcd of scjsoncd soldiers of proper 
physical quality, and carries out one of tlic recommendations of thc 
1toj-al Commission on Recruiting, 1SGG. 
.At certain stations abroad, infantry battalions should bc replaced by 
Royal Narincs. 
By reducing the term of scrrice to d i n t  is really ncccssary for the 
proper training of soldicrs, and encouraging, so fpr as consistent with 
reasonable cflicicncy, anangcnients with tho object of prcrcnting an 
interfercncc with the inclustrial occupations or education of young men 
who yoluntecr for military scrvicc, an increase of tlie number, and a 
supeiior class, of reciwits, may fairly be expected. 
Tlic inducemcut would bc still greater, if military scrricc were a 
road to Gorernment and parochial cmploj-nient. 
But c-icn if no sucli increasc took plncc, a proper application of the 
principlc advocated v-ouId enable one-half tlic men ~ h o  n m enlist to 
bc placed in rcser-ie so soon as tlicir ni1itai-y training is complete ; and 
we should at once arrire a t  the great desirlcratum of creating a com- 
petition for retention in the ranks of tlic regular Army. 
By having a separate and supplementary engagcnicnt for India and 
garrisons abroad, tlic number of men annilally required for long scr-iicc 
would bc reduced to less than 10,000, n numbcr niuch less than thc 
ordinary supply of recruits. 
The period of service abroad could then bc defined and aclaptcd to  
thc cliniatc of each station. 
If one in ten of the 2G0,000 men who annually attain the age for 
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IIII:  O R a A X I Z A T ~ O S  OF OUR XILITART FORCES. 181 
nlilitary service could bo induced to engage for short service, with a 
liability to subsequent service inn rcserrc force, and if onc-third of the 
nien who FO engage (or one in thirty of the ~ l io l c ) ,  were, after being 
trained, talrcn on for Indian and Colonial Service, the Army and its 
rescrrcs could, nt n comparatirely small cost, be kept upto any probable 
requirements. 
Tlio adoption of n system of drill in all State and rate-aided schools 
~ o u l d  tend to sliorten the period of inilitary ser.vice, nud, conscqncntly, 
the cost of tbc military force. 
The question of relatire cost of long and sliort sci-rice vas fully 
entered into in tlie papcr read in lS68.* The financial conclusions 
a r r i d  a t  rrerc adopted by Sir Charles Trcvelyan, and I believe they 
were substantially correct. 
The annual pay and personal allowances of an infantry recruit 
amount ‘to about 332 per annum; those of a re-engaged soldier to 
€40 per nnnum. This is irrespective of pensions.- 
If pensions be taken into consideration, tlic awragc pension being 
320 per annum, tlie average annual cost will bet- 
1. Of a re-engaged soldier during liis second period of serricc, about 
2. Of n long serricr: soldier, during 21 years’ sei-vice, $48 per 
nunum. 
3. Of a sliort seriice soldier, during 3 J-ears’ enrolled senice, about 
338 per nonum. 
4. Of a Reserve soldier during service in Reserve, 26 1JCr nnnum, ill 
nddition to suclz retaiiiiizg fees as inay Be necessary to secure his 
occasional prejence with his c o r p .  
It may be obscxed that over 40,000 soldiers were re-engaged 
bctwxn tho 1st July, 1867, and 31st December, 18G8. Of thcsc probably 
owr  30,000 will survirc to  earn pensions at the completion of 21 years’ 
serricc, and tlic pensions Till probably arerage not leas tllan $20 per 
mau, so that nnless some immediate steps be taken to iutroducc n 
system of reserre service, such as I hare indicated, n very largo 
addition, probably not less than half n million per annum, may be es- 
pectcd to the non-effectire cliarges, after the year lSS0. 
I n  tlic Army Estimates 1871-2, just made public, pro-iision is made 
for over G6,OOO non-commissioned Ofiicers and men, on tho cstablisli- 
ments of tho infantry battalions and depbta a t  home. 
If tho ricx-is I adrocato be correct, theso regimental establishments 
may be iucrcased by 50 per cent., or to over 100,000 men, without an 
increase of charge. Of this number, orer 50,000 would be coiistantly 
present with thc regiments, and 1OO,OOO mould take part in tlle annual 
nianccuvrcs. 
I makc this statement deliberately, and with a Iinodedgc of adminis- 
tratiro details ncquircd during a long period of scrvice a t  the Office. 
X65 pel- aMWU 
8 Tol. rii, pages 327,328. 
j Thc calculations arc based on thc Gorernmont Annuity Tables QIoncj Rctnm- 
able) in tkc ‘‘ Postal Guide.” 
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182 THE ORGANIZATION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES. 
I therefore submit that the proposals arc worthy of careful considbra- 
111. Regimental Organization :- 
In  order to adapt our present battalion arrangements to tho system 
of serricc proposed, it will bc necessary that the head-quarters of crcry 
rcgiinent shall, in time of peace, be a t  home, that the cnlistmcnt and 
training of recruits aud supervision of aniiy reserves sliall bo con- 
ducted regimeritally. 
I n  fact the regimental organization should bc cstendcd, so as ‘to 
dei-elopc indiriduality, in order tliat it  may be said of a11 in regimental 
authority, their “ licarts arc in the service.” 
Each regiment should consist of two or more battalions, one battalion 
bcing usually on Indian or Colonial service, and made up to its quota by 
periodical drafts of volunteers from tho home battalion. To thc liomc 
battalions sliould be attached rcservcs of incn who had sen-ed in the 
ranks of tho corps, sufficient to makc up both battalions to thc war 
est ablishment. 
Tlic Officers commanding regiments should be made responsible for 
the recruiting of their regiments, and be entrusted, subject to proper 
clieclts, with the maoagetncnt of tho rcscrn?s, which are held in rcadi- 
ness to fill up’tlic ranks of tho corps in the event of tlic occurrencc of 
war or otlier contingency requiring it to be placed on a service footing. 
Subject to approved regulations and to supervision of the Generals 
of districts, they would determino tlic time and plnco a t  which each 
rescrw soldier should undergo his annual training, and probably rcgu- 
latc the retaining fee accordingly. 
They viould, in fact, bo generally responsible, not only for the drill 
and discipline, but also for the establishniciit awl administration of tlic 
regiments. 
This incrcaso in tlic ostcnt and duties of n regimental command, 
This could be donc by creating a new reginiental grade of ‘( Colonel ” 
corresponding to that of Colonel of a brigade of Artillery, or of Colonel 
Cominandant of n division of Narines. The appointment to this grade 
and through it to reginicntal commands, should be mado by sclcction. 
Tilo cost of this grade could be met by reduction of recruiting staff 
due to conducting the recruiting rcginicntally. 
Regiments should bo allowed to form recruiting connections in such 
localities or locality as may in cadi CRSC be approved. 
The connections to be kept up by t1ie;ncn in Reserve;-by occasionally 
cucamping or quartering the corps in a locality with wliich it may havc 
special connections ;-and in some cases by cstablisliiug recruiting rela- 
tions with particular corps of militia. 
6‘ Local connections” may thus be maintained in all parts of tlic 
United Kingdom witliout localizing regimrnts ; and without creating a 
difficulty in respect of nationalities, n difficulty for wliicli those who 
hayo ad\-ocnted n general fusion of tlio line and militia haro not so far, 
as I h o w ,  proposed n solution.” 
Eztract from Report of theRoyal C O I ~ Z ~ ) & ~ O I Z  01) Zecrzrit0aj (lSGG).--‘‘We nould 
tion and discussion. 
lioulrl be folloxed by an increase of position and pay. 
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THE ORGANIZATION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES. 183 
By establishing the head-quarters of each regiment permanently 
a t  home, the changes of station need not bc frequeiit, and facilities 
could be afforded far tho useful employment of men whose time may 
not be fully employed at drill. 
The several rcginients could be encouraged to produco or manufac- 
ture many articles of focjd, clothing, and equipment, which have now 
to bo purchased. 
During the summer months battalions could bo moved into camp 
with their servicc equipment. 
During winter tho men, especially those who had acquired, or dcsircd. 
to acquire, a knowledge of crafts, could be employed on productivo 
work with profit to tLemselres and to the  administration. 
In  place of deteriorating as workmen, young m,en could learn, with-. 
out cost, crafts for which they would otherwise 1iai-e to pay fees of 
apprenticeship. 
It may be said that these arc mere theories, but to those who are in 
doubt as to what can be done in thc direction indicated, I would sug- 
gest a visit to the School of Military Engheerjng, where the recruits 
for the Royal Engineers arc trained, and to the head-quarters of 
divisions of Royal Marines, especially of the Royal Marine Artillery, 
where the producfivo powers of the men ar0 profitably developed, and 
certainly without loss of military efficiency. 
Details of the composition of rcginients and battalions formed under 
the principle adyocated will be found in the appendices to this and the 
previous paper. . 
These details can bo modified to meet a new distribution of the 
forces. 
Eight coypany battalions are proposed as affording a larger number 
of cadres and as having other advantages. 
It is, however, proposed to allot four battalions to a brigade, iu place 
of three. 
The system of regimental organization worked out for the infantry 
would, with some modifications, be applicable to the artillery and 
I t  by cvery means encourage enlietmcnt a t  head-quarters of regiments, and i t  seema 
" to us that if soldiers going on.furlough Kcre empowcred to beat up among thcir 
I' friends for recruib, for whom they would receive the regulsbd bringingmoney, 
" mme desirable addition8 might be msde to the ranb of their reapective regiments. 
"We have cramined various witnesses iu to the benefita which might result from 
" loealiziig different regimcnte, or connecting them with special countien or dis- 
I' tricts ; but we cannot say that thin would be a desirable or expedient courae. 
' I  On the other hand, strong eddence has been laid before UB showin'g the advan- 
tages r e d t i n g  to recruiting from a local connection being maintained between in&- 
" diridual c o r p s  and certain localities. Men enliat much more freely in corps which 
I' already contain a number of their friends and acquaintance ; and such connections 
" should, therefore, we consider, be in evcry way encouraged. Much may be done 
" in this direction hy strengthening the relations that exist between particular corps 
' I  of the Army and particular Militis regiments, whether arising from county deno- 
mination or other circumstances, and the object might abo be facilitated by the 
" line regimente suppl ing goad non-commissioned otlicers to the corresponding 
' I  Militiaregimcnta, ang by directing the roluntwring from each Militia resment to 
" one, or even two or three, regiments of the line." 
YOL. XY. 0 
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. .  
'For tlic field artillery I diouId propox. R furtlicr increase of ,  ficlrl 
liattcriw. I 
. I woiiI~I, wit11 defcicncc to artillcry nuthoritics, B i i g g C S t  t l int  it 1y011ltl 
be i1csir:iblc to.Iin\-c :I gun batteries ;-iiuiu~eriug nliout 100 Son-corn- 
iiiissioiiecl OIIiccrs arid men, and GO Iiorscs ;-as :L Cnptain's coinilland. 
TWI of-such batteries woiiltl foriu'aii apl)ropri:itc coniinnnd for a Field 
Olliccr, :in11 IIC tlic proportion for n Lrigatlc ('1 battalioils) of iiihintry. 
Each lint tcry sliould l i n rc  a diipliciitc cquiprnciit in rcxrvc, and a 
1)roportioii. of tho ~~iii-cniiiniia~ioiictl Ol iccrs . i d  :iiicii in rcsc'rvc (say 
so), : i i d  of tlio rcsc'r~c 'Iiorscs (say SO),' slioulil Lc 1i:iLlc to':ippcnr at 
ilic annual iiiaiiwiivrcs. 
..~lic.iiurlib~r,of tlic biittcrics :it Imie I I ~ Y L '  rcccntly bcca madc up to 
56; ofiG gdus.cac!i ; total 33G giiiis. 
I vioulcl cuiivcrt tlicsc iiito ,S4'Lattcriw, bf 4 giiiifi cadi;  total 3313 
guns, :iiid providd.cacIi b:ittcry with n ' reserve. During the suiiiiiier 
inriu~u\-re~,  500 giins could be brought out, niid nrraiigcnicct3 matured 
for inaliiug i i l )  tlic total iiiiriibc~ or giiiis t o  G Z .  
Tlic: Eiigiiiecr Rcscrvcs niiglit co:isist- 
Of Soii-coiiimissic,iicd Ofliccrs aild snplwrs, who, riot being skilled 
artiliccra, l i d  p i c  tliroiigli a full ,coiirac of iiistroctioii at.  tlic 
.Echod of .!lilitary Eiiginccring.. 
Of i i m i  on tlic Ordnaiicc Surrey, and of :irtilicers beloiigiiig to crafts 
uot employed in  building opcmtioiis, for ~vlioii i  suitable ciiil)loynicnt 
CfJllh1, bc found in Corcrrimcnt or Iirivatc factories. 
Of iiicii of ICSJ t h i  50 .j-cnrs of agc who Iiad served n frill period 'of 
lioinc and colonial Ecrricc. 
IV. 3riIitia.:- 
JVitli rrgard.to tlic Militiu, objcctioiis prcsciit tliciiiaclrcs to plans 
for  1oc;iilizing rcgiiiicnts c?f tlic,liiic,Y or to such n gcricral fusion of tlic 
regulnr and niilitia,foircs RS ~ ~ i i l d  do :tiray with tlie dihrictioii which 
i io\~'csists.bct~~.leii  our '' offcii?ivc" and 'f clcfciisivc "~forces. 
I t  is therefore coiicciretl tliat.. the Nilitia rcforni sliould be 1-ega1a- 
tioiis as to training such as Gill bring tIic force up to th:it Yt:itc of 
cflicicncy wlii+ will enable: each httalioii to fill np tlic 11Iiiyc assigned 
to it iii :in Ariiiy, Lrigadc or division. 
'In order to  do this, a proportion of hlilitia Off icers, ~ori-cuniiiiissioncd 
Oficcrs, aiid iiicii might LO nli1iudly trniued with the rcgiilnr ,rccriiiiciits. 
I dcluicitc IiroposGls for iisiiig tlic ,Xilitia as n traiiiiiig 6cLo1 for. 
tlic line.. Tlicrc arc O Y C ~  3,000 OIliccrs and over 9,000 Son-comiiiis- 
Scc Extract froin Report of Royal Comiuisjion on Rccruitin& . Pngc 8. 
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Tlic prcsciit cst:ibli&nciit of the AIilitin.of tlic tlircc kingdonis i s  
120,000, with 1)nwc+ upon iiivwioii, or iiiiiuiiiciit cl:iiigcr tlicrcof, to 
rniw i t  t~ 180,001) i i i c ~ i . ~  
Xrr:riigciiicnt s tlicrcforc should be rundo for organizing n JIilitia Rc- 
wrvc (uiidcr this tcrui i s  to IJO uiidcrstootl 3 rcscrvc JLr tlic .lfi/;tfu, nnt 
:L rc.scrvc for tlic‘ Arm!/ to l)c t:tkcn Jro,/i the Nilitin) to ~ i n l ~ h  tho 
forcc to bc inndo up to tlic Inrgcr nurubcrs. 
This  rescrvc sliuuld consist of nicn wlin Iinrl s c f i e i l  a full pcriotl in 
tlic Xilitin, or of soldiers who Iiavc scrvctl in tlic rcgiilnr Army nnd 
wlio :ire iiot ciirollctl in tlic ‘crcscrvc” of tlic,ir rcgimciits. 
J\’ith regard to oficc-ring tlic Jlilitin, nrraii,rrcniciits linvc been F ; I I ~ -  
giistcd for tdiiiik nI1, or a coiisiilcrnblc Iiroportinn of, tllc Ofliccrs of tlic 
Militia from tliosu d i o  hail s c r d  in t l iu  regulnr Ariiij-. 
l \ ~ i y  nimiigeiiiciit t1i:it u-ill Imx-itlc an outlet from .tliu g d c s  of 
Siibdtcrn nriil Ca1:t:iiii in tlic .irniy, ;tiid thus  rcrliice tlic proportion of 
Ollicera scckiiig for service in the Iii$er grndc3, will bc nttcutlcd with 
advniitngc to tlic. rcgiilnr druiy m i d  CJIlght to COII~IUCC to tlio cficicncy 
of tlic Alilitia. 
nn cnitict for t\ro-tIiir(Is of tlio ODiccrs w!io.joiii tlic 
hq-, niid this outlet ~vould most npIiroprintclg be, to officsr thc Nilitiii 
mi1 Vo1uiitcc.r forcrs. 
. I tnko for p n t c d  t1i:it t h c  oniix~ririg ant1 cniumnnd of tlic JIilitia 
n-ill I x  t ruusrcrrctl to tlic 3Iilit:iry Xduiiuistrntioii. 
~ i i c r c  s~ io i i~d 
V. Jlilitnry districts :- 
Tliv next poilit is tlic orgnuization of ’  L L D i v i s i o n ~ ”  and “ A r m y  
Cor1)s.” * 
l’lic iitIniiiiistr:~ti~-c mit alioultl bc tlic niilitnry district contniiiing two 
or iiicirc divisioiis of infmtry, :iud oiic or Inore brigndcs of cavdry, with 
due proportious of nrtiIIcry, Piiginccrs, niid tmiii. Eich district will 
thus cniitniii tlic niiclciis of an ammy c i ~ p s .  
. ,+I Iirolwxd tlistiibulioii of districts is il1ustr:itcil by :i map, on Tvliicli 
arc slirnvii .sugptstcil positions of the. Iicnd-qiinrtcrs of disfricts :uud 
Lriplcs, nud tlic caiupu. 
In tliis l)lnii tlic (listrich nro arrmigcd mainly in refcrcncc to tlic 
milway couiuinuicnticiiis nud csiatiug b:irmck nccniiiiiiotlntion, the 1ic:td- 
qiinrtc.w being coirvciiicritly aitiintc, in rckrciicc to tho outlying 
b r i p d c s  :rut1 stntioiiu. 
‘ l ‘ l i i i ~  tlic soiitlii.rii division, with i t s  hcad-riugrtcrs at. ;\ldcrsl!ot, 
(which ~vould coiitaiii tlic niiclciis of nu nrniy corlbs of :io:OOO iufiuitry 
1 Tly origicd and adt3itioi:nl niirubcrs arc- 
SO,@jO 
10,WO 
{ .w,m Fur Enghnd (by 15 nni l1G Tic., c. 60). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I:or Scotland (by 17 a u ~  13 Yict., c. IOG; 23 mi1 2i Tic., c. 91). . { 6,000 
For Irclsnd (by 17 and 18 Vie., C. 107 ; 23 and 21. t i c .  c. 91) . . , . { :?$g 
0 2  
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186 TIlE ORGAXIZATIOS OF OUB 3fILITARY FORCES. 
for the dcfcnco of tlio Soutli Coast), would liaro tlio command of t he  
South-Western Railway and its branch lines. 
VI. Annual Uanccuvres :- 
It \rould be tho duty of tlic Generals commanding districts, and of tho- 
Brigadiers, to supemiso a11 reserves and ausiliary forces locatcd within 
tlieir districts, and to conduct tlic annual nianceuvres. They should 
makc tlicniselves tlioroiiglily acquainted with tlie whole of tlic de- 
fensive resources and requiremeuts within tlieir rcspctiro commands, 
including the arrangements for transport, the mcaiis of procuring at 
6llOrt notico additional horses for the cavalry and art illciy, tlie positions 
to be entrenched, and all tlie iiumerous arrangements necessary for 
turning tho forces under thcir supervision to tlio best possiblo account 
in tlic ovcnt of war or invasion. 
Tho arrangements for tlic management, repair, or destruction of tlie 
railway commuuications within the district should bc carefully prepared 
by tho Royal Engineers, in concert with the Offcia1s of thc railway 
companies, and of officers of the Voluntcer Staff Corps who hare taken 
iip that subject. 
Thc outlyiug brigades and tho Alilitia should takc part in tlie annual 
manceurres. 
Places should be assigned in tho field forco to battalions of Volun- 
teers which come up to the ncccssary standard of efficiencx. 
With apcace organization and distribution of tho Rcgular and Militia 
forces such as indicated, and a corresponding organization and distri- 
bution of tlic cavalry, artillery, aud engineer corps, therc would Ix no 
difficulty in putting into tho field a defensive force of tho strength 
suggested in tho condition of our problem, viz., 200,000 infantry, with 
a due proportion of tho auxiliary arm,  nor would therc bo any delay 
or difficulty in sending abroad an expeditionary corps of (say) 80,000 
infantry with a due proportion of cavalry, artillerx, and cnginecrs. 
If a larger espeditionary corps was required it could bc organized 
within a few weeks: 
There aro many points counccted with thc organization of .our 
military forces which hare  becii purposcly oniittcd from this paper, 
with the object of briuging the points for discussion within reasonable 
limits; for instance- 
Garrisons of F~rtresees. 
Colonial Resen-es. 
Purchase. 
Army Administration. 
Some of these sub’ects liare h e n  referred to in the provious paper, 
but they are purpose 1 y excluded from the present discussion. ’ 
&Ionel OUFBT, C.B., late 9th Lancers: I should wish to makc a fcx obscrra- 
tion8 ~1 the &per which WO hare just heard r e d ,  and in which tho subject is 
olphi,,d in t8e moet clear and lucid manner. I think that a8 thcrc redl is o d j  
one recognized law smong nations, namely, “ thc law of the strongest,” it bctores UI 
to look to our o m  eafety, and ace that our Armj hae such an organization as Till 
enable i t  to meet succeafully any aggrcmion nhick possibly m y  occur. In  ordw 
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TllE OKGANIZITION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES. 187 
t o  form a proper notion of tho number of men rcquisitc for defence and offcn.2- 
for, MI Col. Leaky has justly rcmnrkcd, onc ia part of thc otlier-wc muet look td  
tho state of tlic armies of other continental nations, and rcgulntc our own 
accordingly. The amount of force should not bc grcatly inferior to that of others, 
always, of course, having a due regard to geographical or  other nntural peculiclritie3. 
1 should be sorry to adrance my o m  nnsupported opinion of tho proposition 
wllich RC hnrc hcard concerning thc Militia, but finding it in unison with that of the 
man whose crpericncc is tho greatest, and whose views are of more d u e  than thoec 
of any other living Officer, I dludc to Count Ton Moltfe, I mill simply quote hk 
words. “Thc dXerehcc betmena Militia and tlic Pruseian system consiats in thc fact 
( I  that onc is merely an armed raw lcrj, while tlic other is a nation in arms trnined 
11 to habits of military discipline and obedience.” 
lliere cannot bc the slightest doubt that all war3 of the future will be conducted 
by e n o m o u ~  levies, and thc nation which ha8 failed l o  supply the proper element 
for such Iargc lcvics in peace time, bcforc the war breaks out, Kill hare to take the 
~onsequcnccs, which probably would bc defeat. Xow if such nrc thc condition3 
required to render a nation aecnrc under prexnt circumstances, it  behoves u3 to see 
how wc had better set to work. Wc hsrc herc a proposition bcforc us by Colonel 
baby, and, first of all, under the conditions in which wc lire in England, mc 
must see how the pcoplc would acquiesce in it. 
A n-ritcr in thc Fortnightly Beciew remnrks tllat a tremendous power lias been 
18 erolred and a ruthless ambition been manifested by the Prussinns throughout tlic 
( I  war, and no natian is safe.” 
KO nation is safe, certainly, which doe3 not make tho necessary prcparntiona in  
p a c e  t k c ,  and with regard to this, another mi te r  in tlic Fortnightly Reriew 
‘I But the Prussian syateni is impowiblc in England ; Englnnd will nerer consent 
to undergo Bkmarkbm. Any attempt to forec the working man into thc ranks 
rill be reaistcd ercn to thc dtima ratio popili, no blood tax sliall crer bc levied 
‘in England.’ I f  such i a  attempted there  ill bc an end to tho ruling ela~ees nnd 
the monarchy.” 
Xoa I only a& how is it possible to organize under such an  ignorant impntience 
of performing a n a t u d  duty, sa crinced in the above quotation, a natural duty 
which is submitted to by all other natione? 
If  the pcoplc of this country decline to submit to tho secrificcs necessary for their 
own defence, then they may experience tlic fate of the nntion of old, which cried for 
pawn et urcences, and let the defence of thc country shift-for itself. T h o  grand 
mi l  may not come in our time, but KC may 8ec England sink into D second IIolland, 
and be blotted out for ever from among the great powers of Europe. 
Gcnersl SCXUJXTEEQ, R.M.A : I should like wry  much to makc a few remarks a3 to 
my p a t  reopt at hearing that the localization of regiments is to be entirely thrown 
aside. My belief is that tho wholc succces of our sptem of reserrcs hangs on locali- 
zation. The Iecturer, to Rhom we arc 80 rery much indebted, was good cnoudi’to 
instance thc 31nrine d i~s ions  ns types of pretty good order and succes3 in organDizing 
artiGcers’ work. I had thc honour of commanding thc Marine Artillcry for three 
gars, and can speak on this subject. h’ow, I belicvc thc rcaeon RC are instarced for 
our success in organizing military labour is simply becauac we arc localized j i t  gives 
us time to look about us. And wc certainly do our foreign work a3 well n3 our 
neighbouw. WLcn I had the honour of commanding the Yarinc Artillery we hnd 
about 1,400 to 1,600 men at head-qunrtcrs. We embarked e regiment yenrly, 600 
or 600 men; TC hcl no difficulty in  getting men to embnrk. Embarkation was con- 
sidered rather a boon than othcmisc. I am sure localising regiments would not 
make them too fond of their homes. Morcover, you would ncvcr bc obliged to send 
8 married man abroad a t  all. You might send pour mcn after tw3 jcar3 on foreign 
service, and brinm them back a t  thc end of seren years. I am surc you wil l  never 
ge~rcgimentnl se%ooLa in good order, nor will pou succeed in organizing and working 
military labour, unless pou localiuc corps. I fenr the g e n t  objection is thc cxpcnsc 
of building barracks. Now I bclierc if yon placed regiments in their own counties 
the men would build their o m  barracks with the help of our friends thc engineers, 
SSrS :- 
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and that in tlircc year3 1011 noiild pav nll tlic e y n s c  of your barracks, mid  arc not 
only public Lilt lmiratc pocLcts. I'tliiuk if t c system of IocaI orgnnizatioii i3 
knocked on tlic Iicad, tlic system of local rtscrrcs'will go with it. 
ITitli r r p n l  to instruction. I:uglislimcn arc  rat1ic.r gircn to  fall into particular 
groorc3. If nn E n 4 A m n n  i3 n sportciiisu hc is cxcluiirclyn fislicrman, or  hunts o r  
shoots cxcIusidy-?io doc3 onc thing in particular; and I thiuli n c  follon- exactly 
tlic sanic 'plan in tlic Army. Tlic infantry wan i3 cxcliisircly nn infantry Odiecr, 
and tho 'cavalry mnn k n o w  notliirig w h t c r c r  nbout'infnutry, and tlic artillery mnn 
ditto. An attcmpt h n s  bccn nindc to  curc this iii the Slnff Collcgc, but what nrc 
thcy nmong EO many? Oficcrs rhould bc trained to kuoir nll tlircc nrms nnd t o  
PCC them work togctlicr. 
Lntcly I liarc bccu fortiinntc enough to  j i c t  a book i-uctl by tlic Prus-iau Gorcrn- 
mcnt just  bcforo tlic war, dntcd dune, 18iO,'-tlic 1 s t  kidructions issuccl bcforc the 
war-for o i i tps t  dutic3 and p n d  m ~ w u r r c 3 .  Tlic duty of the t l~rcoarms is bcnuti- 
fully d r a m  up in this book ; n-c h a w  nothing to compare to it. 
IYc Iiarc many tliiiig3 to Icnrn, but thcrc is ouc thing which w c  liarc to uiilcnrn- 
that  is centralisation. \Vc linre taken all the powem out of thc Iinnds of our Com- 
mnnding Oflccrj. Tlic Captain of tlic c o m p a n ~  can do iiothing ; tlic Coloucl w r y  
littlc ; nnll thc Drignilicr or tlic Gcucnl  goes into thc field in m r  totally uiinccu+ 
tomcd to tlic fccdiiig of hi3 o m  troop3 or proriding them ni th  ncccssary stores. I n  
t.his reorganization of our force3 I do h o p  tho Commanding Oficers m a  h r c  R 
littlc powcr. I bclicrc a Prwsinn Cnptain, nlio nnswcrs prcttj- lnuck t! o w  L i c k -  
Colonel, CJII giro a man xrcn days in tlic cclls. 
I think i t  i; n grc:it pity 
whrn TO nrc discussin.. n Eubject of to  grcat naticual importance that nqbody 
should npplj Iiard  or& to cln-rcs or  indiridual;. A writcr of p c a t  repute h a 3  
epokcn iuvcr Iinrsh tcrnis of tlic English nrniy in  tliia Rcrks .  I l n  E ~ J S  (I nx? tho 
articlc n few I;oiir3 ago) that t ~ i c  0l1iccr3 oftlie ~ i i g l i ~ h  Army arc s'prolctnires nncl 
thc  men l'nridl3." I am uot n lines- 
mnn, EO I may q c a k  frecly. I think tlic scrriccs of our linc h&c only bccn cqiiallcd 
by thc Roman nrmy. I think in  tlic history of thc n-orld uo troop3 liarc crer had so 
scrcro a foreign Ecrricc as thc Euglish Linc. They ham douc their duty well alicn- 
c w r  they hnvc bccn called upon; tliey linrc iiot surrcndcrcd in tliou~nnds. I think 
it is r c  n i c  
samo i x a  lins not dn-ays bccn held nbout tlic Army. Thcrc i3 a book n.hicli \re 
mere taught to rcrcrcucc rrhcii wc m r c  children ; in  this book n mldicr's mnio i3 
always mentioned with respect, nnd centurions arc, in :ill initanccj in mhieh t h y  
arc mcntioncd, held up ns men of religion and good conduct. I think the English 
Army is not infcrior to tlic Roinan. 
TlicDiikc of l I A S C l I E 3 T E n  : I diould 1 % ~  to m k c  afcw rcmnrhs ou this subject, ns 
onc iu shicli I liarc ccrtaiuly for a grcat many p a r s  taken n grcnt deal of intrrcst. 
Though I wad grcntly intcrestctl i n ,  and in the main agree with thc wholc scllcmo 
of Coloncl Txahy, therc arc sonic c1ct:iila in it in  which I think h c  doc; not go ns f a r  
BS I d ~ o u l d  likc. I may alao mcntion, thc t a o  last spcakcrs Iiarc Loth rcfcrrcd to 
points in which I cut i rc l j  ngrcc. Tlic firit epcnkcr intimated that  it was hi3 
opinion tliat it wn9 tlic duty of crcry Eu$shniau to talic par t  in thc defence of 
luli country.' That is thc point rritli which I aould start. Wlicu I hhrc suggested 
that  in conrcrsatiou, I liavc dwajs been mct by thc answer that i t  cannot bc done. 
Well, wo linro iiot to do lirw wit11 Icgislation; KC arc discuseing a snbjcct, nnd 
cndcarouriiig to ilrrirc at  tliu lirinciples on which KC may liopc that legislators s i l l  
act; and I (lo not scc .why wc rliould cry "etinlriiig fish" by, in  the first iustnncc, 
snying wc ncrcr can ycrsiinilu ICngLhmcn to  do tlicir duty. I fancy it is quitc 
possible. cqiccinlly now, \slicn as the gcntlcmm who first spoko rcmarkcd, criclcntly 
more thnn crer, E I I C C ~ B S  ROC$ xith p a t  bnttalious, tlic Eng1i.h nation mutt  feel 
morc or lc3e t k t t  their opinion Iins not t h t  weight in Europc a.liicli i t  oucc had, 
* Titlc. " Rcculitious for tlic Instriictionof Trooiis in Field Scrricc. and for G r t d  
' . 
Thc ForOi~fi l~y I?crieto was n h d e d  to this cvcnhg. 
I tliiulr t1;csc cxlwcscion3 cruel and Iin'iL t. 
hard that thcsc czprcssion~ E I I O U I ~  be u e d  of our O5ccrs and mcn. 
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TIIE OCGANIZITION OP OUR JIILZTARY FOI:CCS. 180 
alld thcy mist  attribute that in a grcnt mca:urc to thc n-cnkncss of our forces. I 
tlliiik Euglishmcn arc patriotic cnoudi to bc milling to mabc somc sacrifice for thc 
i n c r c ~ : ~  of thck strength nnd for r&ng a forcc adcquntc to thcir po-ition in thc 
lrorld, n-hcn so small a Etntc ns Smtzcrlond has an organized forcc, not mcrcly rncn 
in nrms, but a fully organized forcc, of 200,000 men. If I may be alloncd to alludc 
to s pcrsonnl matter to illudratc my position, I n-odd tcll you that on tlic 14th 
Augu t  last I nas  n t  IIcrny, in F i ~ ~ n c c  ; a t  that time the King of I’russia’s hcad- 
quartcrs n-era thcrc, and Count Eimnrk was talking to me about our cngngcmcnt to  
support tlic ncutrslity of I3clgium. IIc turncd round 2nd asLcrl mc suddcidy irhat 
army could nc  send to support Bclgium. I said I unrlcratootl n c  could scud about 
40,000 rncn. dt that time thcrc xcrc 500,000 men pouring into Fmncc, w l d c  
France hnd SOMC 200,000 or 300,000 mcn. ?\%t n-odd our 10,000 men liarc donc 
agoinst them 3 Yet TO 
)13rc 30,000,000 in thc United Kingdom, nnd if rrc take thc British racc in tlic 
colonic~, TC harc somc 5,000,000 or F~,000,ooO morc. Thc population of Fmucc i3 
33,OOO,ooO, nnd that of Germany about tho samc. W h y  ~ h o ~ l d  n-c not ham forces 
cqml to them? Our wcalth is cqual to thcir3, andIshoulclhnrc hoped our patriotism 
~ 9 3  cqunl. Tho ballot: systcm has becn adrocatcd by Lord Elcho rcry nbly, 
but I am opposcd to the ballot. If you hart sub- 
stitutcr i t  gircs an unfair ndmntngc to thc rery rich; if you do not hnrc rubrtitutcs 
it is nu unfiiir burdcn upon not only the w r y  rich, but thc middling rich dnss~s,  
bccause of courzc the burdcn of scnice is hca-iicr upon people nlio dcriw grcatcr 
profit from tlic 6c;upntion of thcir time than upon thc poorcr clas:c3 ; tlicrcforc, if 
8 mau is obliged to ECIFC, nhatcrer his position iu life, i t  is n hcnrier burdcn to 3 
rich man than to a poor man. I tlJnk thc only nxy in which it can bc donc Dirly, 
is to makc crcry man ECITC, that is, to lcnrn clrill; to be rlrillcd rnthcr than scrrc, 
for a short timc. M y  opinion is, that you should all upon ercry man to be drilled, 
pay for two ycar3. I ~ o u l d  say that the dcp6t 
of n rcgimcnt ~110uld be in the district from which it  ia rccruitcd. I must say I 
think tlicrc is a wry grcat adrantage that thc re,$nent should be locdizcd. Onc 
5wt adrantage of that nould bc, that the Xilitin battalion s~ioulcl bc part of thc 
mo&icnt--s Yilitin battalion of a definite regiment, and a rolnntrcr bnttalion 
anoth’cr part of tho same rcgimcnt. I n-odd thcrcforc call upon cwry man to drill 
in thc dcpSt of Ilk regiment, in his o m  clktrict, near his om1 friends, witlJu e a q  
rcwh of I& o\m homc, nlicrc hc is not scpamtcd from his home in- 
flucnccs, rrhcrc, nhilc he is ecraing, hc may gct comforts and’ clothing. and 
otlicr things froui Iiomc, and may get short lcnrc to go home during his 
tiinc of drill. hftcr hc has scrrcd 1Jj tKo years, I should suggest that IIC 
should thcn bc gkeu his option of bcing posted to tlic Xilitis battalion, mcrcly for 
scnicc a t  home say, or if IIC \\as inclincd for morc scrricc than that, hc might bc 
cnli3tcd for the rcJcrrc3 of his rcgimcnt. Then he should lnrc anothcr year’s pcr- 
mancnt drill and bc liablc to bc callcd out for more pcrioclical drill diiYing thc t h c  
of hi3 scrricc ; or lic might enlist for pcrmancnt scrricc in the rcgirlnr Army. Onc 
drantagc of t h t  would bc, that you would hnrc a grcat many men. I do not 1 d 1  
to cell them bad names, but thcrc nrc a pent  many loafers and people nho linrc no 
perticuhr occupation in thc country, and nrc too fond of indcpcndencc and of 
pleasing thcmselrcs, to scttlc to nnytliing dcfinitc, aud nho might mnhc rcry good 
solclicre, and prcbably would, if thcy could be got into the A r y i  any how. By this 
system you ROdd force crcry young man on attaining s certain agc to bc practiwlly 
in the Amy for tn-o ycnr3, and I think a peat mnny of these mcu Then t h y  tasted 
dtag ecrricc, would probnbly bc r c r y , d l i n g  to conthiuc nhnt they found to  
entail no pcnt  hardship, and cren a rcry comfortable sort of life. J h y  of them 
a110 harc no particular rezourccj, nnd arc r q  badly off for clotking, and h r c  no 
clofinitc home, nould find thojc proridcd for them in thc Army. YOU mny cnll 
thorn scnm 3, but scamp do not makc bad solr-licrj if sou oncc gct thcm disciplined, 
~rillcc1, aniorpnizcd. a w n  on the other hmlc1, thc on0 objcct to con?ider would 
be that thi3 pcrmnncnt drill nhich p u  call upon crcry young man in tllc country 
to perform, shodd not press too h e a d y  on what I nmy call the bcttcr chscs ,  tho%? 
NhO make B grcatcr profit by their,profes&ns, and .dcriro largc incomcs from the 
It wa3 a humiliating position for an Engli,lijhman to  I c  in. 
I think it is unjwt and partial. 
Tlicre I cliUler from Coloncl Lcahy. 
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1%-) TIIE ORCAh'lZATION OF OUR JI1LZ'l'AR.Y FORCES. 
occupations they intend to follow. In tlic first placc, I do not think two yearj 
would be a very h e a ~ - ~  burden on a young mon who had finhhed hi3 cducntion 
before he began his profession ; but I think you might make it lighter even than 
that, because if a young man had nttaiucd a certain dcgrcc of educntion, you might 
either by his passing an csamination or hnring gained a certZcate in some schoo~ or 
college, nllow him to scnc  for a much sliorter time at  hh o n  expense, to find his 
o m  clothing, to pay for his o n  food, nnd to find hia o m  lodging during that time 
of drill, sap for nine months or a yenr. You need not obligc to lire in barracks 
with the common men, but hc must do hi3 duty as a prirntc soldicr for that time, 
liring nmong others of thc same position in life aa Iiimsclf, but drilling in the ranks. 
By that means every man, whether lie was to be private in thc regular A m y  or 
i n  the rcscrrcs, or thc Xiitia, or Volimtccrs, or nn OUiccr in any of the forces, 
ROdd hare serred a certain number of months; perhaps a year, in the ranks, and I 
do not think there would be any grent diisadrantagc in that. Perhaps thnt is dl I 
need say on that point. I am afraid the time allotted to  me has expired, but I 
should like to say a word about organizatip. I think it is most important thnt 
thc whole force should be organized into carps d'armc'e mith proper distribution of 
thc different arms, and when that ia donc, I bclicvc no good udl be donc until you 
imitate war in pcncc by hsring manmums across country, not prcriouely laid d o n  
but depending on thc features of thc country ; not in fired campa, but produced by 
two equal forces moving againat each other from a distance. There the intelligence 
of cach indiridunl Officer would be cscrcised. Thosc mnnmurrcs  odd be an 
examination as well as ail instruction to crery Officer. By thnt incans you Rill 
find out ,go nro the most intelligent Ofieers, and you w i l l  bo practicallj dcriring 
thc experience of m r  without bullets. 
General RCSSELL, C.B. : I understood Gciicrnl Schomberg to E U ~  that localization 
wa9 a great benefit, and was thc means by which the Roynl Marine Artillery were SO 
successful in raising recruits, and in haring their men EO willino to go abroad on 
forc ip  errice. Now I hare attributed thnt to the frce ration w%en on board ehip, 
and I haw not thc plight& doubt that our o m  men -odd bc ns delighted to go 
abroad end serm as the Royal Marines arc, if they had their rations frce. I hnrc 
always been 3 linesman, and hare been recruiting in London in conjunction with the 
Marines, and I thought the udvantage they had orcr UE in thc line w~ thd'fact of 
this free ration on board ship, that the Marine went away for tllrec or four years, 
came back with plenty of money, went liome to his friends in the country and R ~ S  a 
gentleman for six rreeks following, whereas our linesmnn gocs on furlough on 8d. a 
day, and inatead of helping his old parents and his brothers and sisters struggling 
through life, he is a burden upon them during hi3 furlough. Besides that, it is no 
inducement to friends to urge a young man to go for a soldier, becauso from that 
moment they know thnt they can ncrcr hope to hare the slightcst adrantogc from 
his help in their porerty and distress. The Marinca do assist their friends, wherens 
our men arc so paid that they cannot do it. I tLink onc disndrnntage of localization 
i n  the line is this. I n  my regiment in Jamaica KC lost erery third man in eir rreclis 
from ycllow fcrer.. h'ow if that regiment had beeu recruited from 3 small area, 
could yon expect to get fresh men for that regiment ? Wc wero fortunate enough 
to escape eholera in India, but the 86th lost, I think, 126 men in one night at  
Gunachce. What hope would that regiment hare hnd of recruits, if localized? 
Mr. CnADKICs, C.B. : I bcg to solicit nttcntion to EOIIIC of tlic organic conditions 
.Ahirk somc military authorities concur in regarding as thc bwia of Army organiza- 
tion, namely, widely different qualitics and ~ a l u c s  of different units, ixnks, and files, 
the bwcs of force. Whilst all attention is implicdly concentrated on tho Pruaeian 
system, there is one great example which is beginning to attract public attention 
that hns not hitherto been noticcd in this discussion, which i3 even morc important 
for consideration, riz., thnt of a nation with two million3 nnd n-half of popnla- 
tion, which within two day3 after the opening of the xmr, had on it3 borders an 
army perfectly equipped of 30,000, and in four days 40,000 men, and in R fort- 
night it T o d d  hare becn ready with an army of200,000 men-just the total amount 
of defensire force proposed for Great Britain. I 
have heard EnglLh O5cers ~ h o  have inspectcd the army there, and their opinion 
I mean tlic army of SRitzerland. 
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TIIE OKGANIZATIOX OF OUR MILITAET FORCES. 191 
tllat tho unit of force, tho rnnk and file of tho Swiss Army, a t  all crents, 
wllatsocrcr i t  might bc with the commands, was quitc as good as any brought into the 
field by Germany. And Lam assured that the Swiss Army was seriously CSaminCd 
tcn years ago and six year3 ago for a purpose by Pruaaian Officers, who reported 
that i t  w a ~  highly to bc respcctcd, and might hold its ground ngainat tlieir o m .  
And ct this army of acknowledged first-class diaciplinc and efficiency (prorcd 
in& in portions of foreign scrricc, and highly raluable for trustnorthiness) is 
raised, without tlic thrcc jcars’, or ercn thc onc ycar’s continuous scrricc spoken 
ofto-night I ts  diaciplinc is imparted to the rank and file by rcally not 
more than n month of drill and esercisc in thc adult etsgcs, produced to a great 
extent in aomc cantons by early drill in the school stage, which I h a ~ c  bcen 
sclrocating in thi3 country. Thc last report of the military authoritiea of Switzcr- 
land was, howerer, that to smarten thcir force and bring it np to what was rcquisitc 
-baring regard to the etanding prmy of France on one sidc, and of Prussia on 
tho other, they desired about two weeks morc of drill and field crcrcise3, a3 II 
manacunlng ficld force. The baais of tlic Swiss system in some of thc 
an tons  i3 in thc general drill of the population in the achool Etroes, and 
llence sn  cducated and intelligcnt unit force. I n  a paper which I l a d  thc 
honor of rradin: a t  this Institution, I cited n rcat deal of important and, 
I aubmittcd as I tliiuk, very conelwire Engl ik  military tcstimony &a to thc 
pwt diKerencc that therc ia betw-ccn the cducatcd unit and the uncducated unit. 
It ana brought out, I believe, by that tcstimmy most clearly that an educated force, 
putting it as a simple.proposition, is auperior to nn uneducated forcc in tho propor- 
tion of thrcc to two for thc purpoaes of war. That was before tlic p e a t  Continental 
war. And, looking a t  the action of the comparatirely bettcr cdncated rnnk and filo 
of Prueeis oa againat the less educated rank and file of Francc, I submit that pro- 
position has bcen rerified on the largest scale that was ever presented to obacrration. 
Good education in the school, imparts intcll,igcncc, obedience,- paticnce, morc 
thoroughly than it is ever impartcd afterwards. Bad education, or no cducation, 
karce unintelligcncc, passion, and wildness. Somc military authoritics attribute thc 
efecicney of the Prussinns to the long semce in the barracks. We attribute it to 
the intelligence imparted in the school, for thc schooled force hare beaten the longer 
bnrrack-trained force, thrcc to one, and cren tFo to onc with inferior weapons, thc 
needle-gun against the Chastwp8t, and overthrown them in fair fight, infsntrr against 
infantry, a? almost all military opinions in this country. Well, you hare that 
iost~ncc o tho great efficiency of thc educated unit of force. Our proposition is 
that that may bo had without that extent of long continued Eemice, which is yet 
tnlkccl of &a essential, sincc it  is had mtliout it in Switzerland, and why cannot we 
hare i t  here? I must pay, speaking generally, the the Offiecra of our English Army, 
high and low, are almost exclueirely used to onc unit of serrice, namely, the uneducated 
rough. the man to whom thc lash may bc applied (“KO, no ’I). KO ? W h y  look a t  
the 1wt report of thc military gorernors of military prisons : tlicy say; one aficr 
snotlier, that the lash bciug abolished, was a fatal mistake, and that without some 
equirdent punishment is to bc got, thc disciplinc of the English Army.i3 not to bc 
relied upon. What do you say to 25,000 court-martials ~n a year In 
that forrc, and to 8,000 imprisonmcnts, and bctween onc and trro thoueandpermanent 
msrliinga in onc -year, and the treatment of tliesc conditions as normal condition6 of 
the Army ? 
Tlic CHATEXAS : Yon must adhere a little morc to  thc propositions of Colonel 
Leah y. 
Mr. CHADWICK :Fow ns to thc character of that forec and of thc linc generally, 
there are particular cxccptions, and I have known of grcat exceptions. I wa9 in- 
formed of one, a Scotch regiment, tlic Colonel of which rqiment offercd a wager 
that hC would go upon paradc and borrow S1,ooO from thc priratcs. 
The CI~AIRMAX : W c  arc direrging from thc paper. 
Mr. CHADWICK :But the paper assumes as tho basis of organization a unit of forcc, 
of a common quality, which assumption, I submit, is in respect to efficiency, 
fdecioaa. Lct mc say that Officers who hare had charge of different kin& of forces, 
militarj Olficcrs of extensire experience and obscnation, who haw had chsrgc of 
esecntial. 
(I6 No, no.”) 
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192 TIIE 0I:GXSIZhTIOS OF .OUI: IIILITII:1‘ FORCES. 
tlic pl icc  forcc, say tlint two of tlicir nirii are xrortli nnx tlircc of thc oriliuary 
solilicw, for cflcctii c 11iirposc3 mid cflicicney roiisidcrcd, nrc clicnp at Iiiglirr 
pay; and I liarc licnrd Sir John Ilurgojnc niaiiitnin, niid I .  bclicvc lie iiuin- 
tniiicd with s i i c c k  in cvidciicc, tliat tlic Enppiir3 niid JIincrs, tlioiigli t h y  are a 
Iiiglicr lxiitl furcc t l i m  tlic rmk and file, aiid tlic Olliccrd nrc oii tlic wliolc- 
cflicicucj conridcrcil-not a dcar i f  uot n elimp fvrcc. Diit tlic qiicstion is nliat 
JOII caii.l~nlducc in t c i in iq  ivitlicut tlic ballot Icing l o n ~  coiitiniicrl niid c o w  
pukory. W h t  did Lord 11erilingc say bcforc tlic Scbnrtopol Coniiiiitlcc ? Ilc 
Enid Iic coiild pr rp rc  soldiers in sixtj  dars. Sow, if IIC can I r c p r c  an uu- 
cducatcil ninii in sixty c lap,  wlint cnn JOU do with nu cducitcd r.iiik niid filc to 
bcgin nith, ns thcr h g i n  ivitk in .  Snitzcrlnnd. Tlic swi53 nrliiy cu-t:, f f !  pcr 
hcad nll tlic nny round; t l in t  is fur a nionth of scrricc. 
Tlie CJIAIEJILY : 1 tliiuk JIr. C!in.dwick is clircrging to  n comldcrirblc extent from 
the m:ittcr bcforc IIS. IIc is ciitcring into the qncstion wlictlicr thc Ariiij- should bc 
an cduc3tcd Anq- or not, nnd Cvloncl Lcnhy’s Icctuue is liov >oil will .orpnizc a 
certain numbcr of u c n  iii thc bcst iiiodc for tlic dcfcncc of tlic couiitry. 
Xr. CIUIJ\\-ICK: ,Uiow iiic to sulriiiit t 1 i a t . q -  poiiit is, that to orgniiizc aii 
cduratcd forcc, is a witlclj dilrcrcnt olicratiou from 0rg:iiiizing nn uncilucrtcrl forcc, 
which Coloncl Ldiy’s  paper i irs iUn~3,  nnd it is that nwiniptioii 1) liicli I clisllcngc, 
a3 an uiisouiid tlioiigli a eoiiiiiioii foimdntion. 
Tlic C i ~ a r n u s  : I inii=t’say, rn Chairman, joii nrc dircrging frum tlic qucdicn 
bcforc IO:L 
Mr, ~ I I J I V I C K  : AII, tlicn, thnt I ~ r o u ~ d  say is, tIiiit. on 1111: Sni.-j s)-stcm mc coul(1 
rnisc ~iO0,oC;O ?t 2 5  pcr man, for n month or eir ~ c c k s ’  wnicc, n t  tiro and n IiaIf tixcr 
thc csiieusc incurred in Snitzerlantl, a price dcclnrcd to IJC suilicient to rnirc 3 
forcc ns cflicicnt as the .German n n k  and Glc, upon. tlic roluiitccr principle xve 
iio\r raiw 10,OOO mcn for thc liuc, and if tlic qurdiou of tlic grrnt ditlkrciicc in 
tlic clu:ility n i d  tho cconoiny of tlic unit of forcc bc not tiic fuuntlatiou of eny 
stoblc orpi izd ion  of military form, I, nith otlicrs wlio 11nw crnmiiitd tlic. siibjcct 
US ccouoiiiids, niii rcry great11 uistnlrcn. I n  oledirwc to jour  riilin,n, I forkar 
to prcss thr qiicdioii further. 
Sir CIIA~LES TREWLSAS : 11-c hare nll obxrrcd nitli p c a t  wtisfiiction the rapidity 
Kith wliicli public olrinioii I I M  iiiatured 011 t l k  Euhjrct nll~iinpurtant ’ to our 
nation. JVc iirc eub.tailtislly ngrccd on .thc main principle3 ; vc-nrc rirtunlly 
working on tlic snnic lilies; and thi3 is owing in.rcry p l u n l l  c1rgrc.c to the Far. 
linrucnt, compo.-cd of Quccn, Lords, and Coiiiiuo!~~. The \rliolc nation Ira3 
sat in l’urlinuiciit on this subjcct, which so greatly conccrns its niclJt vital iutc- 
rcstr. Private conrcrintion, thc nmspapcr prcar, .pnniplilct I, more tliaii  an^, 
thc iliscusl.ionj in tlih rooin in uliicli tw arc sittiug, linvc prodiicctl tlri3 result. 
’ Tkc vnhc  of our di5cu.-;ions 119.3 bccn orring in n great iucasiirc to Cidonel Lcahy. 
I ~hnll ncwr forgct tlic iiiiprciiion wliicli n singlc stntciicc in hi3 iird 19spcr irindo 
upon IUC. It 1~x13 
ngrccd that our Ariny 1vns totally insuUicicnt in uuimbcr; it was n g w d  tlint a much 
lnr cr ~ I I J  ~ i i s  nccc.-tnr~; but  3 niucli largcr Ariuy, cuntititutcrl on tilt hnnic pri:i- 
cipfc, w o i i ~ c ~  1invc cost nil irnpmsib1e mni. ~ o ~ o n c l  ~ c a ~ i r  Eiruplr >nit1 “one lon 
scrricc so~(~ic.r oats as niucli n j  ten rcscrw men.” Tlint eiuiplc cnuucintion sprtni  
througli tlic Icngtli and lrrcntli of tlic Innd, and froni that poiut the dircuseion took 
a frcsli etnrt. 1 dillbr with grcnt rrlurtancc from Coloncl Lcnliy as to  tlic liniitcd 
cztcnt to xrrl;irli IIC ~rould carrj tlic principlc of localiwtiori ; ncrcrtliclcrs, although 
n cirilinn, I iiiust csprcss m y  olliiiion. I agrcc Kith tlic Dukc of Jlnuclwdcr a i d  
Cfcncrd Sclioinbcrg, tlint tlic key to  tlie position, is tlic locdizatiou of thc- line re$- 
mcnts. Tlicrc nrc iariouj rcneons, but 1 will only mcntion onc. It i5 only in this nny 
that tlicrcfiinicnt can be mndo a liomc to tlic puth of thc roiiiitry. It is uiilg in this 
way that tlic retircd uirn c m  foriii a n~giincntsl rezcrrc, Ecttlcd, for tlic uiojt part, 
in thc nciglibourhootl of tlic rcgiinciit. Coloncl L a h y  ndmits that tlic rcscrrc niust 
not bc n gcncrnl rcscrvc, scattcrcd d l  over tlic country, but n rcgiiucutnl rcscrrr. 
Tho wcrt of Euglnnd furnishc3 an interesting illustration. Gciicrnl Schoiiibcrg 
know3 that the Jlnrirics nrc crtrcinely populnr in Ucronshirc nnil tlic w:tcrn part’ 
of Somcrwtsllirc. , TTc.k;rrc all n home fceling tlicre toasrcb tho Unrincs. Thuc 
It rccnif.tl n3 if xrc llnd found tlic solution of tlic wliolc problc‘iii. 
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TIIE . OIGANIZhTIOX OI' OUR 3"LIThRP FORCES.  293 
circnmjtailcc~ of tho inarinc lieail-qiLirtcr3 nt l ' l p o u t h ,  aiid of tlic farourall6 coil- 
llitiolij of Ecrrico on bmrd ship, arc known in  crcry vill:igc, arid tlic state of fccling 
tllcrc in rcslwct of this Grancli of tlic sciTicc i3 such a3 iiiizlit bc produccd in crcry 
coullty in  b g l a n d  in  rcfcrcncc to it3 own linc rcgiincnts. l'lic ~ a m c  state of thing3 
cxi.tcil in r c g r d  to the artillery in a largo district in tlic north of IrcIand, os ing  to  
peculiar circnuistancca connectcd nitli tho recruiting. .I thinl;.\rc arc all ngrcctl that  
tllc locnl Militia rc$mcntr E~iOdd Lo nlI;lintd morc or lcss to thc line rcgiinciits. 
is anothcr point on wliicli I nni pcr:-nndcd that Coloncl Lcaliy rrol11d agree 
B-itll mc, that, in order that n nna .mny Lccomo.a suhlirr, i t  t nccc3sar~- that hc 
&ould Icarn, not ouly drill, bu t  discipline. In an a w m l l y  like t k ,  it  is qnitc 
unncccssnry to ciplaiu r d m t  clircipline includcs. It. inclndc~, f i s t  of all, Fclf-con- 
fidcncc, fonntk?d on f d  profcssiolid t rainiiig+oillidcncc of lhc Ioldicr i n  ilrimsclf; 
,,Cxt, confidcncc in h i 3  cornradc.., Iiic right and Icft h i d  ninn ; nnd, nborc 311, con- 
fi&ncc in his ODiccra. Sow,  to my nothing of gjmnPe.tics, drill, niuihctrj, aud all 
t1ic hnndrcd things a solilicr 113s to lcnni, i t  is Eirn 11~ impossible that n Nililiti3 IIXIU 
can,lenrn dixiplinc in onc montli ; and, no rnettcr\ioi-.oncn that niont~i  s rcpcatccl 
sfcund and third Lnttzlioii~ to thcm. h - 0 ~  thst prclurec is going t o  bc aLoli;licd, 
t11at ia not ncccssnrj'to my nrgumciit. I nil1 €81, i f :purchwc i 3  going t o  
be nbolishcrl; i t  mill bccomc quitc practicable to karc  only ouc cndrcof Ofliccrs and 
onc lino of promotion for cncli county rcgimcnt, including tlic 3Iilitin buttdions, as 
wcll aa thc linc or gcncml scrricc battaliou ; aiid tlicn tlic nntural coursc of Icrricc 
would nt oncc tnkc place bct.tsccn c l i k c n t  claEscs of O5ccra. Tire yoiingcr unmarried 
mcn ~ 1 1 0  wislicd to  scc tlic world, would go to  India, o r  rliercrcr clsc tlicy wcrc 
nantcd, and n g  tlicy mnrricd, or a 3 . h  .youiig.mcn of furtune ruccccdctl to their 
property, and wkhctl to cngngc in county buiincse, and so on, tlicywould rctirc into 
thc Xilitia biittnlions of tlw rcgimcnt, rccciring pny only ~ l i i l c  thcr  wcrc actually 
scrTiiig. I said tlint c r c v  mnn sliould bc'traiiicd for a rear, and at  tlic cnd of t h c  
ycnr IIC Ehoiild tnkc liis choicc wlicthcr hc noulcl rctuni nt onca to ciril lifc a3 a 
Militia man, subject o d y  to n few day3 cxcrci+2 in thc nnnunl field niaiiccurre3, or 
,wIictlicr hc nould cutcr the linc for a limited tcnn of ycnrs. A s  tlic grcnt difliculty 
ie to gct a young mail nway from hi3 liomo and imdcr the colours, nncl ps i t  i3 found 
by cxperienco that mhcn D young mnn h a  oncc bccn trained under thc colour3, ond 
pccirrtolucd to military habits and military nsmciatcs, lic cnsily goc3 on for ii furthcr 
period of eerricc, I think thcrc iroiild bc no difficulty nbout. recruiting ... Of c o u ~ c  
trcry facility ~ o u l r l  bc rcn for tmnsfcrring traincd mcu from t1ic:Jliliti:r ;to tlic 
linc ; and, on tlic otlicr ?and, tlic matured,scilsoncd mcu, x~ko lind rcrrcd tlicir llircc 
year3 in tho line battalion nt horn:, or iu tho .JIcditcrrancsn gnrriions, or their 
sewn ycars in  India, mould return into tho rcscnc of lhcir rcgirncnt. \Yc arc a11 
agrccd tlmt 311 branches of thc scrricc should bc under thc Gcncral commanding tlic 
dirision, ant1 that  thc g c a t  nortlicrn dirkion, containing SO many million3 of iiilin- 
bitants, shouhl n o r  bc split up into four or firc Ecporatc c&triCt?i, cnch with its onn 
Army corps. I om p e r s i d e d  tlint 
if the  Army is propcrly rc-conrtitutcd, and if, to a rcrtain cxtcnt, nccording to tlic 
plan I liarc subniittcd, the h~ ir constantlj cxuboclicd in tlic facc of tlic populn- 
tion of cacli district, in  conucction with tlicir relations, friends, nnd ncqunintilnccs, 
and if ccrtain other induccmeuts arc offered which would bc highly coniluciw to tlic 
efficicncy of tho public EerTicc, thcrc  rill bc no  clificulty wliatcrcr in  gctting a sum- 
cieut nunibcr of rccruits. This nation h a  nlrays shown a strong rnilitaiT slirif, 
which is not likcly to bc dhiniplicd by tlic cxaln Ic of rcccnt crcnts. 
Captain , \vALTEiz: 1 shou~tl lilrc to makc a FcK rcmnrks upon tliis subjcct. 1 I 
tlin!i most of tho spcnkcr3, and Coloncl Lcnliy too, hnrc rather beggcd tlic qucstiorito 
awr ta in  cxtcnt. ~ c ' l i a a  assumcd that  itwill ba easy to gct mcn to orgmizc. Now 
e r c r J b d y  here howsperfect l j  well that  llicrc hna d n j s  bccn the gcntcst  d i u l t p  
S o  forin of conscription is a t  present ncccssav. 
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194 THE OECANIZATION OF OUE MILITARY FORCES. 
i n  the world in procuring tbcm. Tho one great difl;culty n i th  tlie E n g h h  Army 
has hccn that of gcttiiig recruits. That i 3  a subject which may bo fairly talicn 
into cousidcmtion fo-night; and I hare one particular reason for nsking you t c  
considcr it, bccauw i t  alfords me an occasion of stating that there will be perliaps 
nnotlicr opportunity of cnteriug into it to-morrow, when nny gentleman who c3u 
conic mill hear Lo:d D’crby malie a epecch on a subject which cannot fail to engage 
great public attention, and certainly will bo brought on in the IIousc of Commons, 
I hope with EUCCCSS. Our plan i3 simply this. 3n  order to induce recruits to enlist, 
you shall throw opcn to them the whole of the ciril appointments in the scrvice of 
the State. Tlicsc civil appointments amount to at least l00,OOO comfortable situn- 
tions, ranging from 550 to 8150 R year. I n  addition to thcac 100,000 situations 
under Gorernment, which from time of memorial hare bccn the spoil of politicnl 
parties, you haro a t  least 150,000 moro of a semi-official charactcr which mi& 
properly be gircn to soldiers, and held out aa a reward to thcm. I am conrincd if 
that is done, you will simplify the whole question rery considcrablF. It is rery 
little UEC talking nbout organization until sou hare something to organize. At 
the cnd of the Crimean M’ar we wcm 60,000 men short of the numbcr Toted 
by Parliament, and really it seema to me a porfcct farce to hear men calling 
thcmeclrcs statesmen talking about reserve forces, when you hare not got such a 
thing in the country. What i3 the u s  of having 500,000 Militia and 150,000 
Volunteers if the Guards or the Rifle Brigade are 100 men short of the number 
they want to facc the enemy? Not the slightest uae in the world. I say no man 
is to bc lookod upon as a soldier in the bcst snd moat extended sense of the term 
unless he ia.*ablc and rcady to go anywhre  at  fire minutes’ notice. That ia the 
utmojt time any good aoldicr rcquirea. I say a man who means soldiering must be 
rcady to do this, and I venturo to my there is hardly a gentleman in tliis room 
now, howcrer old he may be, who willnot endorse this opinion. This is not forcign 
to the object of this mceting, and I think, therefore, before you enter rev much into 
the subjcct of how you are to organize men-whether you are to get them from One 
particular county to go into a particular r@ncnt, or not-we should consider the 
best means of gctting them. There is no doubt that the men are fit for 1h0 ciril 
placcs I Lare rcferred to, and, if not, you may depend they will mnbc them- 
The CHAIRMAS : Remember that the subjcctbeforc tlie mccting is “organization.” 
Captain WALTEB: I am in tlie hands of the Meeting. I think so far it is part 
of the subject, bccause, in one of his paragraphs, Colonel Lcaliy has alludcd to the 
possibility .of opcning out the Civil Service. I hare had something to do with the 
management of men for aome ycars pa& and I hare come to the conclu3ion that 
there is really only one way of managing them, and that is by makiig eyerything 
their interest. It ia not a diUicult matter to  ride men without guard-rooms and 
flogging. My syetcm is similar to that which haa bccn obecncd in tho Life Guards 
with thc greatest possiblo 8uccc89 for many years, and sliould be adopted throughout 
the whole Army, i.e., thc immediate expulsion of cwry disreputable charactcr. 
The CIIAIRMAS : I must appcd to the Meeting again, and to the honourable 
gentleman ; I think he is dircrging from the papcr Coloncl Lcaliy has read. 
Captain WALTER : I hare atatcd nearly all I Wid1 to ~ay.  I bciiere tlicre is Tot 
an Officer in this roomwho does not lieartily wish that the rand to the Civil &rrm 
should be thrown opcn to our soldiers and cailors, and, if Po, let them do all they 
possibly can to cncouragc it. 
Captain ETASS-FREXE ATIXEB : Wc linre heard a rcry nble papcr from Colonel 
Lealiy, but it has chiefly been confined to supplying the unit of the service. We 
hare not had much said about what wc are to do with the unit when we hare got it. 
Heremarlis at  the end of his paper that he  can put under his system 80,000infantry 
in the field as an eipeditiounry corps, while R larger onc can be organized within 
fcw vcclts. I think before we try to 
catch our hare w c  should be prepared to cook him. \Ye hme only now in England 
nbout SO battalions, and if tlicy were incrcased by any system of reserrcs, either the 
Duko of Manchcstcr’s or Colonel Lcahy’s, or any othcr, to the fullest extent, they 
would only represent about 8 0 , ~  men, while in the field the7 would be a good deal 
d r C d  SO. 
IIe does not say how it is to be organizcd. D
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TIIE ORGANIZATION OF OUR MItITARI' FO11CES. 195 
less, because through thc exigencies of war thcy could not bc kept ~ l p  to thc full 
Now this force is perfectly unsuited to thc warfare of tbc present day. I f  
we go any length from our baso of operatiom, the length of line must be protected, 
supply, conroy, transport, and erer j tbg  must be protected, and peoners must 
be guardcd (I hopc x c  shill take some). Under those ~ircumatanc~s 1 say that 
~,~ men is too small a number, aud with OUT military forcce orgnnizcd as they are, 
or 88 Colonel Leahy proposes, I do not think we could put into thc field, without 
using thc Militia, more than 80,000 men, no maftcr how good the sjstcm of reservc 
might be. Thc Militia RC cannot'use for t l h  purpose n6 they nrc a t  present con- 
atihited, and we hare no other cidrea which we could fU up, no mattcr how strong 
the reserve, and this is, in my opinion, our weak point. This is the point first to bc 
coneidered ; before we think of getting the men wc must first see how wc an? to UBC 
them. Therc haa been one spatem suggceted by Lord Elcho in one of his letters, by 
which certain Militia regiments should be allowed to voluntcer for service abroad, 
bu t  this, I think, is wrong in principle, beCaUBC thc Commander-in-Chief, or the W a r  
Mi&ter should be ablc to say exactly how many men lie could put into the field a t  
any given moment. That is the first thing necessary, and if he lcares it to tho 
volunteering of Militia regiments to say we will go or not, he is nercr ablc to  dcclare 
how many men hc can put into the field. Taking then 86 m j  standing point that it 
is necessary for a War Minister to be ablc to speak thus, I say I hopc KC s h d  have 
wme system which Rill give us a greater number of battalions, or a sp tcm by Rhkh  
a greater number of battalions can be formed when required. Colonci Leahy by hie 
@ e m  proposes,after bringing up 138 fir& rcserres, EO as to put 80 regiments in the 
field, to bring up his other reserree in a few weeks, and to form new regiments. 
XowLthat is almost an  abeurdity under the cireumatences,becauee with all ou;p 
05icers, and Non-commissioned Officers in the field, it could not be done. There is 
another system which I should like to bring before this meeting, which I think a 
far preferable one, and wl$+ has been supported by Lord Derby, namely, doubling 
the Militia regiments, by ginng toeach, another battalion, onc battalion being office& 
by retired and half-pay Officers, and enlisted for sen-ice abroad, the other officered 
as at preeent, for service at home. Under euch a system we ehould liare ou r  80 line 
regiments as the firat line, and tie our second line, 130 battalions of infantrf Militia 
(for that is their present number), for senice abroad. These men, of course, might 
have a little extra training, and more attention pnid them. Beside, they would be 
officered by Officers retired from the Arms. Therefore, wceliouldhare80 line regi- 
ments in England, and 130 battalions of Militia, or 210 regimente which would, of 
eouree, represent a force of about 2OO,ooO, and that would be without weakening OW 
defensive forces in the dightest. Lord Elcho's eyetem of letting Militia regiments 
volunteer on thc ayetern practined during the Crimes, by which indiridual men, the 
units of the Militia, were allowed to volunteer into the Linc, ie simply robbing 
Peter to pay Paul, robbing the defenske force to in-e the offeneire, and that ia a 
moat rotton system, bccause a Commander-in-Chief can never say how many men he 
can becertain of for any particular duty, but hss tolook torolunteering at the 
moment that he wmta them. We have left thiu, the chief point, out of considera- 
tion, and I think it requires more attention than any other, namely, IIOR we can 
plaee our men in the ficld when we get them. I .will jwt say one word about 
l d i s i n g  corps, becauee I mentioned my opinion on the subject to one of the 
Council, and although I know it is contrary to the views eqtertained by a great 
many here, still I think it would be cowardly if I refrained on that account. I thiik 
localising will never do with our L i e  regiments, for this simple reaon. The 
recruits got in different places are very different, one regiment raiecd in Porkahire, 
and recruited in Yorkshire, will get fine stalwart agricultural labourers, while 
another located in Mancheater dl get thc vcry opposite style of men, wlioae morab, 
principles, and crerything else, hare been ruined by liring in towns. I think 
loealising would never do for this reason in the fir& lace, and besides 88 certain 
regiments only can be used in war, while Bome are in t t c  colonies, these  ill suffer 
while the others in India, Canada, and elsewhere will not suffer at  all, consequently 
the wholc weight of the suffering of the war would be thrown on certain clistricte, 
and 80 for regular service I think localizing will never do. 
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106 THE ORCISIZATIOS OF OUR HILITARY FORCES. 
:TIIC ~ r r r :  OF ULYCIIESTET.: 1 sliould suggcjt nii nltcration iii wlint tlic Iioriour- 
oblo grntlcninn.lia~ ,said. 
tho R t p l n r  b:ittnlions, nnd n l m n j s  liarc a ilcpGt bnttnlion a t  Iiomc,.mhicli elioald 
drill tho Jlilitin, nnc forin tlic dcp3t of tlio battalion abroad. 
A T'ISITOC : Tlic gciitlciuau mlio spokc FO dispnragin:ly of tlio Ifanchcstcr inen I 
tliink ,\rould nltcr liis opinion if lic saw thc physiqr!e of. tlic J h t  rolmitccr rrgimcnt 
in Manchcstcr. 
Captain ATLULC: I - m n j  cxpl~i i i  thc word Jfnnclicstcr was only urcd ns apoiw 
pnrlcr. 
. Tlic TISITOC: I nu1 r c r j  glnd to hcnr it; bccnurc you Iiarc certainly not sccu that  
rcnimcnt. 
b j o r  L L r E S O S :  I irisli to iiinkc n fc\r rcmnrks on localization. T h o  nro ccr- 
tninly grcnt atlrantagcs mhicli liarc not bccn brought to noticc, that is to say. if a 
rrgimcnt nbroacl p i n s  ccrtnin famc, nll the men nrc indiridualkcd nt Iion!c, and in 
thcir Tillage3 they arc tliouglit m3rc of, nnd thcy thcmsclws think a F l a t  gcal more 
of bciug broiight. to noticc in thc county xvhcrc tkcr mere born, and rrlicro nl1,their 
fricnds licnr of it. It nko 113s thc c r w t  of stimn1:itiiig thcir fricnd3 to  join tknt 
rcgimcnt, tlicrcfore I think in many n-ap tho rccniiting might bo cnrricil on rcry 
atlrnutngcoiidy in  local districts. I tliiik d50 with r c p r d  to rcgiiiienta, cnch r c 4 -  
rucut might bc formcd of two battalions. W c  cannot a t  nll npproxiinatc to t l c  
I'rn&n srstcin; our Ariuy miizt bc of nn cntirclr dXcrcnt fornintion, for this 
rcnsoii, that mc ~ i n w  cxtcnsiro colonic3 to M e n d ,  nnii a great portion of our A ~ J  
must ba nmnrfrom Englmd.  In fact, thc gentcr  bulk of thc Rrgiilnr h i r  most 
be lor tho dcicncc of our Kidcly cztciidcd colonies, and that forcc must Lw supplied 
hj yoliintccrs. Inetcad of forcing uicn into tlic scrrico rrc ought to otl'cr ccrtnin 
intluccmmts to mnlic thcrn vriisli to joiu'thc & p h r  drnij- nbro:id. It must not bc 
EllpDoSCd that tlic loser  classcs, or rnther incii i i i  humblcr spl icrc~ 'of lifc, nro dcsti-' 
tutc  of ambition; t h y  likc to roan1 about nnd travel ris much n 3  tlioao who Iinrc 
Incan$, and cnlirting iu tlic Army is tlic only means that  they linvc of sccing forcign 
countries. It is a grcat induccmcnt to mcn to cnlist, p r o d c t l  t h y  linon- thcy mill 
bo tab-cii cnrc of. Ylicrc nrc manF iiiduccmcnts for thcm to join tlic Iuilian A n h j  ; 
tlicy cnii m a q ,  nnrl tlicy Iiarc a clinncc of getting 011  in lifc wliicli tliey do not mcet 
n t l i  nt homc. I tliiiik our rcgimciits might bc r c r r  wcll fomcil  of b line battalion 
for forcigu scrricc wlim rcqaircd, niid of n rcscrrc battalion. to transact nll  .the 
recruiting, and to pnss thc mcii into the linc, madc soldier.;: . Tllcn ngnin I : E h O i l l d  
diridc thc Jlilitia into a n  Amy NilitiaRcscrrc, fhnt is to sar, mcn whohaic cnlistetl 
on thc uudcrdnnding that  they nro to:join thc A r q -  in t&c of war, au? a'.qcroiid 
b.ittalion of tlic 3iilitia to Lw for homo'ecrricc, tlic wholo four bnttalions to conrtitutc 
3 rcgimcnt. Xilitin nrc to a l l .  intcnts nnrl p r p o x 3  soldiers, but  Voliiutccrs BC 
miist look npan in cntirclr n ' d i h c n t  cetcgorj. ' Thc 1atc French w 3 r ' I m ' ~ h o ~ i i  113 
tlii3. JIcn who can disband t1icmiclrcs, who cnu icfic ivhcn thcy 'choorc, nnd lion. 
tlieychoo.;~, mhoac tinic is,tlicir omu, wlio arc dcpcndcut upon tlicir labour for tlicir 
brcnd, cannot bc cxpcctcd to do tLc ~nmc,ns.  pnid >oldicrs, nncl i t  ia-for that rcnioii 
I tliink thc- iuuet a l n a ~ s  .bcxousidcrcd Aj of a dill'ercnt CIREI, only aradnblc'for tLc 
defciicc of 'tlic country. We must count ulmou.thcx mcn for tlic dcfiuccof nll our 
works. 11 tbiuk tho gcnter 'per t  of .our'.Toluntecrs ought ' to  be .infantry. ' mien 
s p i n ,  tlic h n y  constituted at, m x n t  being 80 rcrj-fcr, as compnrctl to Cohtincntal 
nrmics,.tho grcat bulk of i t  oii& t o  bcloLg to  thc scicniiIic bnnchcs-ko ouglit to  
~ R T C  a.rcry largc forcc or artillery, and R considcrablc form of Cnralry. .Thcy,nrc 
tlie salicnt anglcs, tlic bnstions of tlic work, ahich  rre can cnsilj fill up witkinfuntry. 
They nrc tlic brnnchcs that t d c  eo loiig to ,  forin, and, conicqucntly, thcir term of 
icrricc iuwt  bc longer than thnt of tlic ordinarjinfantrj.  .Thcro is no qucstioii 
about i t  Kith rcgord to infantry that  t1ic.v can rcv mcll bc fornicd in six months. I 
am alliding to the mcrc UBC of nrm'3 nod crolutious that may bc rcqnircd bcfcrc tlio 
cncmy. I nm not rpcnliing of infantry nsit will bccomo bf ecrricc in the field, biit I 
sny that our wen nrc not .taught to lirc n3 they roidtl h a w  to  do iii thc Gcld. ~ I C U  
tlint l i rc in  barracks and homcs nrcnot nt all nccustomccl to cnruplifc. Thcrc is t l c  
grcat fault in  our organimtion, t l i n t  mc do not accustom our mcii to ' l i rc  as they' 
no~t ld  l i re  in tkc iicld bcforc tlic ciiciny. Our. ucn  nrc.not at homc in  their tents;. 
Bcriilcs doubling tlic 3Iilitin rcginicnts I s1iould cloublc . 
' 
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THE OCGAK‘IZITIOS Oh’( OUR >IILITAKY FORCES. 107 
tllcy may bc a t  liomc in tlicircnnips of instruction ordrill grounds, but t h y  arc tiot 
as if they w r c  cn~nmpc(l in front of nu cncmy. T i m ,  again, 11 itli regard to our 
UtiUcry, tvc rcquirc a r c r j  largc forcc of artillery co1np“icd to that of other nations, 
for this rcnsou, that for tlic ~VIIOIC of our Lillian’Ariny, tIic artillcrj is furnislicd from 
tllc lloiue Army; ~ r c  hardno natilc artillery thcrc, and tLc conscqucncc is we rcallj 
haw a w r y  innoficicnt forccof artillcry. I n  cax  of XRP wc should require in India 
alone a T C ~ F  largo fsrco of artillcry, and as for our ni tillcry in Englnnd nt prescnt, KC 
talk about hming 40,000 men, but ccrtaiuly our aitillcrj i3 crcn siuallcr in propor- 
tion than t h t  ; considcriug that a t  IGuigegiatz tbc I’ruaeinns andhs t r i aus  brought 
8olncthimg likc 2,200 gunsintoaction, rrhcrc should wc bcif wchad to fight a gcncral 
action a i tk  our possibly 60 gim3 horsed mid manned a3 t h y  arc a t  present? I doubt 
whether tlic prcscnt arraugcincnt, cutting off onc end of tlic blnnhet to SCK on to the 
other, mahe3 it ally larger. I cannot sco that making thc garrison artillcry iuto field 
battcrics incrcaoce our artillery. I f  wc take thc number of guns that IIC linrc ou 
ollr fortificationsin England, tlicnnmbcr of Ecld guns wc hare, or ought to haw, in 
tllc field, FC 11arc not really non’ one eflicicnt artillcryman to onc gun. W h y  should 
diminish our gaITkOn artillcry, why Eholdd wc changc thch  into field batteries 
I t h i d  
this is a subject that rcquircs grcat fittcntion, that i3 t o  saj- thc propcr organization 
2nd maintcnnncc of thc Ecicntific branchc3 of thc Army in their full numbcrs and 
cfficicncy. 1 am sorry 1 did not see any notice of this paper, or 1 should 1iLc to 
Xajor GEiRT, R.h. : I would not IIWC rcnturcdon tlJs occasion to  hare addrcsscd 
a11,~ obscrrations in !hc prcsencc of OfIiccrs mho arc EO grcat:-r m y  eeniors, but, from 
reading the ncrrspapcr3 carefully for thc last sir niont113, rand froni vhat has bccn 
said nt this meeting, I find that crcrybody has dccidcd tl!c question ‘of inilitarr 
organization, cxcc t the Ilowc of Connnons. I supposc that will follon- 33 a matter 
of coursc. I shaE not attempt to go into the w11olo question of military organiza- 
tion, but mcrcly touch upon tliosc point3 ’r~hicli pcrtoin to mc intliridually a3 an 
artillcrynina. Coloncl Lcahy 1x13 propo~cd that a battery should conskt of four 
guns. TIi$ nppcarn to mc a.sort of cxpcdicnt rather pcrtaining to thc thforctieal 
than to the practical man, becnuzc it has bccn found from espcriencc in the Peilin- 
guln and otlicr placca, that six guns is the largest uumbcr orcr which onc iudiridual 
can cscrcisc R pcrsonal influcncc with adrantagc, and, thcreforc, I cannot scc that it 
would bc attcnded by any cconomy to the State to  diminkh tlint command from six 
to four, crcn althongh supplelnentcd bg a thcoretiral rcwrrc of four guns, which arc 
to bc callcd upon in somc Tar, which I could not exactlr follow out. To return to  
thc qucsjion of localization, mthout going orcr all the ground nliicli has been so 
fully trratcd of by gentlemcn herc to-night, I will colrfnc nij-sclf to it so Lr a3 i t  
appertains to t1Jc nitillcry. I think thc artillerprnzy bc broadly dividcd into ficld 
and garrison, and in tlicir rcquircments tlicy inrolrc tvo  rcry opposite things. .The 
morc yon can knock ficld artillcry about tlic bcttcr t h y  arc, but tlic morc you can 
locdizc n garrison nrtillcry for tho dcfeuce of a plncc, the bcttcr. I tllink TTC hare 
8 rcrx good csamph bcforo us in thc militia artillery of thc Chanucl Islands. Thcsc 
mcn kno~r crcry rock, crcry sounding, crcry ph~sical fcaturc of the ground, or thc 
water orcr mliidi they ~rould hare to firc. S o r ,  I think if we could allow, out of 
tkc regular ~ N F , .  say as many as two roxd nr t ikry pinncr3 for crcrj gun 
that ie niountcd in position, thcu our maritime dcfcnccs might bc cntrustcd to thc 
artillery militia and roluntccr artillery undcr tho supcrintcndcncc of Officers of 
thc Rojal  Artillery, each corps being toldoff to tllc dcfcnccs iu their ovin locality. 
Momorcr, the rcscr-ic nrtillcry should bc‘ conGncd to tllc maritimo countics. I 
~ o i i l d  mako nicii nlrrays aork a t  tliosc particular dcfcnccs which they would bc 
called upon to dcfcnd in cnsc of inrariou. I rrould crcn carry out the principle so 
far s this. If  it am3 D T e q  largo work like Portsnioutli, I would not say such a 
Irgincnt of ~~o1untcer;orinilitia i3 to garrison Portsmouth, but I rrould say, “You 
will go to So.  1 or Xo. 2 baition, and tLcrc nrc your guns.” I would suggest that 
nhcn tlic Xilitia and Voluntccr~ arc called out for training, sudden alarms &odd 
be gircn occasionally, so that a t  a gircn signal ercry man niiglit rush to hiis placc. I 
nmpcrfcctly surc v c  rliould find b j a  p r o p  sjstcm of supcrintcudcncc of the Royal 
wc hsrc plenty of incn that will makc good artillcrjmcn in time? 
, gonc furtlicr into tlic subject. 
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198 TIIE ORGANIZATION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES. 
Artillcry Officcrs, that the greateet enfetde cordiale would epring up bctwecn the 
Royal and the reseme Artillery, and thc w e m e  artilleryman would takc as much 
pride in his &n as the horsc‘ artillery man takes in hia position aa a horec artillery 
man. I made pnc remark which may be taken exception to by mmc of the gentle. 
men preecnt, that I would confine the reserre artillery to the maritimc countics. It 
ie  for this reawn, I think i t  would be timc mud training throm away to get up field 
batteries and horse artillcry, as we bare Been done in Bomc places. It must take 
time to form an efficient field artillery. YOU muet hare horns and harncss, and 
they cannot be callcd out for training for a month or two months in the year. ! l l c  
horns muet be nlPrays in training, they mu& be always groomed, and their harness 
must always be kcpt in proper repsir. Therefore, I think that work properly pcr- 
tains to the regular artillerpan. But I beliere if wc were to hare a properly 
organized system of militia and rolunteer artillery for the maritime defences, so 
that in a c e  of one of these sudden invasion panics, that occur about ererr  three 
years wc know ercry gun mounted on thc defences round England and Ireland had 
its quota of militia and volunteer art i l lerpen ready to comc and work it under 
proper supcrinkndencc of regularly trained OlBcere; that it would go a great Kay 
towards giring us a feelin of confidence. As for the largc question of battalions of 
rewrrcs, I lcare that to t f e  general Officers here present, who arc far better able to 
deal with that eubjcct than I am. 
Captain HEITHOBS, h.-p., R.A. : Allow me to  m y  a few words straight to the 
point upon clause 6. 
‘ I  Each military district to be provided with the nuclcua of a conipletc staff for 
I‘ an army- corps, one or more divisions of regular troops complete in all arms and 
‘1 requirements for active seniee to be quartered in each military district.” We 
want more than the nucleus of a complete stall‘. JDe toant fhe nuclerrs of a cons- 
plele niderialjfi-out in each division. 
In  all our military dietricta there are numerous T’oluntcers who, though intclli. 
gent, useful, and most excellent in their way, cannot be counted on exactlyaa 
regular foreee, for soldiers are made more by discipline than by drill. 
Three thinge make a soldier: drill, discipline, and the uee of the material belong- 
ing to his arm of the service. 
On the latter consideration we ought to have in each dirision an organization of 
skeleton equipments, perfect in ercry thing but men, commanded by and intr~sted 
to a field Ofiicer, assisted by two or three subaltern inetruckm,PFith a few aerjeants, 
and handy men for the,instruction of volunteer Officere and privates. Tkeae field 
htteriee, batteries of position, cavalry troops, pioneers, engineering and pontoon 
trains, tcnt and cooking equipmente, &c., complete in all material, would be all 
absolute worth; alwqs ready and efficient if wanted for actire aemicc, only re- 
quiring manning ; they ehould go about from pbce to place and furnish instruction 
to Volunters. 
Volunteer chiefe, as .won a~ competent, Shodd have chargc and command on 
parade, until the time allotted for instruction in the locality finished, and the skeleton 
train moved off to gire others a help on. This would be a great element of 
volunteers wodd karn that it RBS com- 
po& of horses and material, the former to be shod, groomed, cared for, harneseed, 
lookedaftm, and taught, according to a system. That each part of the harness had 
a definite use, and required fitting and adjusting accordingly; that the easiest draft 
of guns and waggons wan abject to e e a i n  rules. Tkey would learn ta ride, to 
drive, hook in, and unhook thci: teams, mount, &mount, pack, and unpack their 
batteries ; take their guns and carriages to piece for water traneport, and in a few 
minutes put them together again. 
I n  a like manner pioneen, would soon be up in the p S i n g  of obstacles, formation 
of attacks, loopholes, construction of obstacles, and deatruction of cover; riding 
men would learn thc uee of cardry weapone. Volunteer sappers would build 
a pontoon bridge, construct works, or drive mines, in emulation of the regulars, and 
all would soon be as well up in carrying, tent-pitching, and field-cooking aa would 
be oemspary for real work. 
SUoceee. 
Thus, a battery goen to a certain phcc. 
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T H E  O l ~ C + A ~ I Z A T I O S  OF OUR IIILlTART PORCES. 199 
~~0111rtccr3 would flock in for instruction such ns this, for crcry Englishman ir 
to learn ; crcry roluutccr will attend aoinethiug I:CW to b2 acquired. 
Khcn  thc skcktou troop or train had fiuishcd its allotted time iu onc locality, it  
sho,lld morc off to its nest station, EO on, round and round thc diriiion. S t r a t t g  
woL1ld dictate tho bcst positions for tho dcrclopmcnt of certain arms of tlic serrice. 
~ ~ s r ; s  and citics ~ o u l d  liarc thcir Eappcrs, thc coast would furnish garrison artil- 
l c r p c n ,  riding troops, from our Foung farmcrs, who could not arord to entcr tho 
gcoulanry, into our caralry of rcscrrc lhelping thc yeomanry itself if rcquircd), and 
tach arin of tho Toluntccr army would haw its lcgitimatc dcrclopmcnt.. 
~-01untecrs cannot sparo 
time for much camp residence, tlicrcforc mid them camp cspcricucc a t  home, gct 
tllcul as wcll up as possiblc in camp lifc and the usc of matrrial, and get a fen- field 
xnjor WETIlERED: 1 ou-lit to ap0bgkC for intruding anx rcmarks on a subject 
,,-hick I hare not fully c o n h m d  1 am ccrtaiii if Eughnd should uulinppi?y bo 
dr31m into 3 Europcau war, that wd must bc prcparcd to act on thc orensire. 
England, lcas th:m any othcr nation, can aKord to carry on a dcfcnsirc rn. By EO 
doing ~ r c  ~ h o d d  inritc invasion aud the destruction of our commcrcc. n’eithcr can 
If our Flcct is to 
xnder efficient scrrice. it  must be frcc t o  comc and go, tp kcep opcn thc hightray for 
our commcrcc, and to snccp the ECBS ofcrcry cncmg’ssliip. Thercfore, looking upon 
thc question in that Tim, I think mc must bc prcparccd to carry on an olfcnsire, ns 
pFclla3 o defcnsirc n - q ,  in othcr words, to strikc tritli all our forcc, instead of waiting 
for the cncmfs blow. I do not ECC lion t rc  can possibly succccd unlcss it be on 
Egmc such plan as thc lccturcr proposes. If n-c arc to ha\-c a largc and an cfficicut 
Lirniy, prcparcd at  any niomcni to takc tlic ficld for any purposc, irc must hare that 
ilriiiy a rcgular paid efficient forcc. We cannot call out our Xilitia and T‘oluntecrs 
2nd send ont 100,000 or 200,000 to takc thc ficld away from our o w i  sliorcs. TIicrc- 
fore, to harc a EIlffiCiCnt and an cnicient forcc in rcscrrc wc must necessarily resort 
to shcrt scrricc, and by that in can^ raioc n lioinc rcscrrcof tmincd soldicrs rcadg to 
s t d l  thc ranks of thc regular hi?. But that proccs3, of c:oursc, \rill ta%c sonio 
ycnrs to tlaboratc. If1 mistakc not tlic timcs arcpressing. Wcliarc all bccn rather 
st3ggcrcd a t  tho orcrwhclming forccs which ham been throim suddenly into tho 
recent conflict. Thcrc has been a great deal of talking and writing, but I do not 
BCC that we h3rc adrauccd onc’singlc stcp tOKardS placing this country in n statc 
of prcparation crcn for dcfcncc. One prcrious speaker rcniarkcd that “ )TC ought 
first to catcl: our hare.’’ I consider that wc liavc caught a prctty good ham already, 
but thc cook has failcd in his duty, and if ivc wait much longcr wc may catch a 
Tartar. TJ71icn I look at that tablc of figurcs I scc that wc lrarc somc 400,000 incn 
who liarc comc forward roluntarily for tlic dcfcncc of thcir country. Is it not 
esaentinI t o  makc immcdiatc nsc of tIic mntcrial at  I1and? Can w i  not without 
dclny raisc thew men to tho greatcst statc of cflicicncy ? ’Why not call out our 
Militia for six months’ training? It is n merc m:itter of moncy, nothing morc. Wc 
ehould thcrcby creatc D SOIITCC for supplying our Rcgularhmy with truincd soldicrs. 
With rcgard to  the Voluntcers, as n-cll as tlic Militin, tbcy want morc cncouragc- 
incnt and greater induccmcnts to attain ciiieiency. Wc 11arc donc wry  littlc for 
them. Lct us now do 
what wc u n  to raise thcsc mcn to a statc of cflicicncy ; having done that wc can sib 
down and talk calnily orcr our fnturc plans. I am afraid that under the prcssuro 
of thc timcs, thc IIousc of Commons will bc induced to pnas soinc mcasurc that m i y  
prow iujuriow to thc country. I should bc rcry sorry to sec Englishmen cocrccd 
into thc scrricc whcn they arc rcady to roluntccr aud be drillcd for thcir country’s 
dcfmcc. Thcrc is no occasion for that, for I am surc if wc trcat ineu properly wc 
d d l  hare roluntccrs enough to raisc all the forcca we uccd. At prescnt our men 
&rc dischargcd in D way not a t  all calculatcd to bring tlicm back iuto tho scrricc. 
Tllcsc mnttcrs arc not Icft cuough in the hands of military incu, couscqucntly the 
feelings and ricir3 of eoldicrs arc not considered. A certain reduction is ordcrcd, 
and 80 man~hundrecl or thousands nrcetruck out of the Estimotcs. The officials a t  
the War Office, accustomed to thesc reductions, gather togethcr and consult. Witb 
I bring thcsc points forward 5s practical suggestions. 
out of thcni nhcn IOU can. ~ 
dcpcnd upon our Fleet for thc protectiou of our own sliorcs. 
Wc hare grudged cPcr.y shilling laid ont upon those forccs. 
VOL. sv. e 
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thcm it is a mattcr of nicrcclcrk-likc procccding. So many lucu rcprcscut EO mauy 
pounrla, and a 1argc numbcr of cffcctirc nicn arc at  oncc struck off tlic strciigth of thc 
difcrcnt rcgimcuts.. Tiicsc iiicil arc often dismissd long bcforc thc expiration of 
thcir tcrm of cngagcrucut, and in a \-cry incdnsidcixtc maiincr, without duc prcpra- 
tion for such an cmcrgciicy, and at a acason of tlic Fear nlwn cmploymcnt is diflicilt 
to  bc found. Some of tllcsc mcu, ~ l i o  had culistcd for n tcrm of tcn pars ,  aftcr 
haring scrred about ciglit p a r s  abroad, rcturiicd to England from rarious CnlEC3 ,  
and naturally looked forward to completing thc unzxpirctl portion of their rcrricc a t  
homc, with tlic option of rc-cn:aging within tlic last six montlis of thc period of 
thcir tcrm of acrricc, and rcccidng a bounty, agrccably with tlic conditions cristing 
a t  tllc timc thcy cnlistcd, but xrlicn thc last rcductions took plncc thcsc mcn wcrc 
suddcnly rcquircd ciihcr to rc-cugagc a t  oiicc, cightccu moiitlis or two Fears bcforc 
thc cxpirntion of thcir cnpgcmcnt, uudcr thc altcrcd couditiou of 105s of bounty, or 
to  bc dismissed fortliwth. Thc rcgulatious cxisting whcii thcsc incii cnlistcd 
Eauctioncd thc pz~mcnt  of 20s. on discliargc, and this sum is still coutinucd to tlic 
men \rho rc-cngagc in licn of the allowance thcy wcrc eupposcd to bc cutitlcd to on 
clischorgc, but thc men who r c rc  diaclmrgcd, as aborc dcscribctl, and all othcrs 
taking tlicir dischagc on complction of thcir tcii ycars' tcrm, arc scnt away with 
only 5s. in tlicir pockets, often linring to bcg thcir way : such trcatmcnt is not calcu- 
lated to cncoxragc culistmcut, as thcsc men go about tlic country giring to all witli 
whom thcy conic in contact, a wry unfarourablc imprcssion of military scrricc. I 
koiilcl say a fs- Kords about organizatiqn ; that is n wry laric subject. As our 
rcgimciit~ arc a€ prcscut constituted I caunot sec tlic adnutage ofcouuty localization. 
Thcrc arc w r y  fcn- rcginicnts that haw any distinct locality. Xen cnlist from all 
parts of thc kingdom and rcry oftcu to gct array from thoscloca~itic~ hi mhicll t h y  
lirc, and rritli no dcsirc to rcturn. Thcrcforc, it  noulduot oppcardcrimblc to localizc 
rcgimcntj as a t  prcscnt constituted. In coursc of timc wc might idcntify ccrtaiu 
rcgimcnts xritli ccrtaiu localitics, by raising tlic men a3 far as possiblc from tliosc 
localities. I do not scc m-vhy rcgimcnts both at homc and abroad d l ~ ~ l d  not hnvc 
rcscrrc dcpdts councctcd with ccrtain districts, placcrl under tllc instruction of a 
thorouglily compctcnt staff; such cstablisl~mcnts mi$t form a nnrlcus for tho 
BIilitin. and Voluntccra ofthe district. By tliat ~ncans 111 proccs of tiinc roil might 
idcntify ccrtain rcginients with ccrtnin districts and liouic rcscrrc3 of Xilitin. But 
at  prcacnt xrc arc notprcparccl for that. When ~ r c  try to carry out auy Echcmc m-c 
gcncmlly brcali [ lorn in detail. Take thc case of dcp8t battalious, tlic idcawas rcry 
good, t h y  wcrc cstablishcd a3 scliools for uniforiu iristructiou, but t h y  broke dorii 
becausc thc sIstcui was not cnrrie? out in dctail. d dcpBt battalion ma3 composcd 
of thc de$s of about eight di5ercnt regiments conccntilltcd under ouc star, wvherc 
rccruits for thcsc diffcrcnt rcgimcnts wcrc drillcd and instructcd. Of coursc, if 
you scnt your sons to any pnrticular collcgc you would take carc to asccrtnin that a 
good and eficient staff of professor3 and instructors wcrc cmploycd, EO that t l q  
might bc properly cdncatcd for tlicir profession. With thcsc dcp8t battalions thcrc 
mas no propcr prorision madc to Eccurc cficicut drill and instruction. And wlicn 
you dcsccnded to thc non-commissioned stall', instcad of finding a corps of trained 
mcn, tlic rcry rcnmc mas the caoc. Tlic custom was, wlicii arcgimcnt was ordcrcd 
to embark, all thc good and cfficicnt non-conmiis~ionccl oficcrs and iucn wcrc sclcctcd 
for scrricc n-ith tlic head-quartcra, lcning with tlic ilepbts tlic mcrc rcfusc, men, iu 
i k t ,  unfit to procccrl with thc regiment ; tlicu out of this bcmtifulrcfusc tlic Coloncl 
commanding thc dcpbt battalion Iind to pick out hi3 drill instructor3, and hon-com- 
missioncd staff to iustruct the wliolc of thc rccruits for tlic rcgbcut. By such a 
qs tem it was simply impracticablc to cducatc or drill mcn eflicicntlj. IYc take, 
perhaps, from six to ninc montlis to drill a recruit, wliy i3 i t ?  Bccausc tlic rccruit 
docs not get facilitics for drill. Go to our largc camps, and you will find in nclimntc 
likc ours! pcrhaps for onc-third of thc Scar, tlic xucii caniiot undcrgo thcir drill. tiicrc 
is no drill slicd. I t  i3 n most painful thing in tlic winter to scc tlic incn standing 
out in thc midst of the coldest frost handling thcirfirc-locks, 2nd going through tlicir 
ordinary drill, as if it mcrc opcn suninicr xrcathcr. All tlicsc things rcquirc to be 
considcred, and if attcndcd to, it  would iq ro \ - c  thc Army rcry mucli. Take again 
thc simplc thing of clothing.. J\'c.thiuk morc of appcarnuccs than anything clsc. I 
TnE OP,GAKIZh!l'ION OF OUR XILITARY PORCES. 
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IyiIl sar nothiug about the construction of the clothing, 'tccausc 111,' onc call ecc that 
the men are not clothcd for scrricc, but for slioir. Look at tho way in rrhich they 
put on their clotliing. 
Ihc  CIIAIRJI~S : That Iiardly comcs rritliin thc conipas3 of this paper. 
I\hjor WETIIERED : I wantcd to  remark that our soldiers, as n conscquencc of 
being supplied with thcirnerr clothingon the 1st of April, for thesake of appcamncc 
t h o  spring rmicws, rrcrc litcrally =ore x m i l y  clothed in siimnier than in wintcr. 
But as 70" h a w  rulcd that thc subject docs not come within the paper, 1 will zit 
dom.  
On thc motiou of Ctcneral Sir William Cotbiigton the mcctiug 1ra3 adjourned to  
T7;cclncrday crcuing, Fcbruary 9 n d .  
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